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ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains two chapters that are related with corporate finance and
law. Below are the individual abstracts for each chapter.
Chapter 1: Do Patent Lawsuits Cause M&A? An Experiment Using Uncertain Lawsuits
I investigate whether there exists a causal relation between result of a patent lawsuit
and alleged infringer’s subsequent M&A activity. I find that if the court gives an infringement
decision, then the infringer sharply increases spending on focused M&A and decreases on
diversifying M&A. Moreover, the infringer specifically acquires targets that have substitute
patents so that it can redesign its products or form a shield against future lawsuits. Patent
motivated acquisition channel is new to our literature and different than the traditional
knowledge transfer channel. For the experiment, I hand collect detailed data on all patent
lawsuits that were appealed to Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). In this
court, decisions are given by majority in randomly assigned 3 judge panels. In a setting that
resembles regression discontinuity design, I use only the lawsuits where there was a dissenting
judge (i.e, decision was given by 2 to 1). Since CAFC is the only appellate court for patents
and has federal jurisdiction, my experiment is not subject to endogeneity problem stemmed
from court selection. This is the first paper to use dissenting judge lawsuits for identification
strategy. The same approach be can be generalized to other types of litigations.
Chapter 2: Do Uncertainties in Bankruptcy Law Affect Optimal Loan Contracts? A
Quasi Natural Experiment
I investigate whether uncertainties in bankruptcy procedures shape financial contract-
ing in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Utilizing a novel hand-collected data set, I exploit
ii
the application of substantive consolidation procedure in the U.S. bankruptcy courts. This
procedure has two unique features. First, it removes seniorities granted in the original con-
tracts, resulting unexpected huge losses on unsecured bank loans. Second, there is consensus
among practitioners that its application is unpredictable since there is no specific provision
in the U.S. Code. I find that after exposure, lenders transmit this shock to other clients as
requiring collateral more often in their new loans. Moreover, if exposed lenders issue new
unsecured loans, then they demand higher interest rate and tighter covenants, even control-
ling for bank capitalization, borrower and time fixed effects. To my knowledge, this is the
first paper to show that uncertainties in the bankruptcy procedures provide an important
friction in the loan market. Furthermore, this work complements the previous literature by
providing a new channel for the determinants of optimal financial contracts. Results of this
paper are also important for policy makers, who want to ease bank lending standards.
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Chapter 1
Do Patent Lawsuits Cause M&A? An
Experiment Using Uncertain Lawsuits
1.1 Introduction
Competition in product markets gives rise to a new war arena: patent litigations. From 2010
to 2012, there was a twofold increase in the number of patent lawsuits filed in U.S. district
courts1. This sharp increase was also accompanied by unprecedented damage awards. For
example, in 2012, jury patent infringement awards three times exceeded one billion dollars.
Excessive threat of litigation also shapes firm resource allocations. In 2011, for the first time,
spending by Apple and Google on patent lawsuits and patent purchases exceeded spending
on R&D of its new products. Despite its growing economic significance, causal effects of
patent litigations on corporate policies has not been investigated, mainly because of the lack
of appropriate empirical setting.
In this paper, I fill this void in the literature and investigate the causal effects of patent
litigations on M&A activity. Specifically, I ask the following questions: Does losing in
a patent litigation cause an alleged infringer to make particular type of acquisitions (i.e,
12714 patent infringement lawsuits filed in U.S. District courts in 2010 escalated to 5423 lawsuits in 2012.
1
focused vs. diversifying)? If it does, what are the explicit transmission mechanisms? I find
that if the court finds a patent infringement, then the infringer sharply increases spending
on focused acquisitions and decreases spending on diversifying acquisitions. Moreover, I
also find that the infringer specifically conducts patent motivated acquisitions, in which it
acquires targets that have alternative patents to the ones it was found infringing. Acquired
alternative patents provide the infringer the opportunity to redesign its products or form a
shield against future lawsuits. The litigation caused acquisitions explain a sizable portion of
the overall M&A activity; a conservative calculation demonstrates that these results explain
around 8% of all focused acquisitions and around 4% of all domestic M&A transactions.
The main challenge to testing these hypotheses is the endogeneity problem. Unobservable
variables that drive a firm to win or lose a case may also drive the firm to make a particular
type of acquisition. Therefore, a hypothetical experiment setup requires random assignment
of alleged infringers to control and treatment samples. The control group should include
alleged infringers who prevail in the case and are able to continue its production. Treatment
group should include alleged infringers who lost the case and may need to stop producing
infringing products. In this framework, the strength of the identification strategy relies on the
degree that assignment to control and treatment groups is not correlated with unobservable
variables of alleged infringers.
To solve this identification challenge, I propose a unique experimental setting that exploits
the institutional details of the patent court system. In the U.S., a patent infringement claim
is initiated in U.S. district courts. If any of the parties is not satisfied with district court
decision, then it can appeal to the higher court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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(CAFC). It is the only appellate court for patent cases and has federal jurisdiction. In
CAFC, cases are heard by randomly assigned 3-judge panels. The decision is given by
the majority rule and the judges in the panel can dissent by writing a dissenting opinion.
For my experiment, I hand collect detailed data for all cases with a dissenting judge (i.e.,
decisions was given by 2 to 1) to assign alleged infringers to treatment and control groups.
The dissenting judge cases are rare; they make less than 0.4% of patent lawsuit universe.
Therefore, I argue that assignment of alleged infringer to experiment groups is close to
random and my estimations establish a causal relation.
This identification strategy is also robust to many endogeneity concerns. First, due to
the unique institutional structure, CAFC is the only appellate level court for patents and is
located in Washington, DC. Therefore, my experiment is not subject to selection problem
due to forum shopping. This unique structure for patent appellate court is different than for
other types of litigations (e.g, bankruptcy) in which parties may select a court in a favorable
location. Second, it may be argued that since writing a dissenting opinion may take a
significant time, a judge would dissent less in the times of high case load. Such a situation
may raise endogenity issues due to mismeasurement of the dissenting cases. However, my
statistics show that there is no relation between caseload and number of dissents. Third, it
may be possible that some judge may dissent less in some periods due to career concerns.
However, this concern is minimal since all CAFC judges are appointed with life tenure.
Fourth, it may be the case that parties may know CAFC decision due to judge’s specific
orientation. However, the evidences show that it is difficult to predict CAFC decisions
beforehand. Allison and Lemley (2000) investigates whether CAFC judges are pro-patent or
3
anti-patent and they conclude that: “Judges do not fit easily into pro-patent or anti-patent
categories, or into affirmers and reversers.”
The patent motivated acquisition hypothesis is also backed by anecdotal evidences. For
example, in 2012, Google acquired Motorola for $12.4 billion. In this transaction, Google
paid $5.5 bil. for patents, $2.9 bil. for cash acquired and $4bil. for Motorola business and
other assets. In a couple months after the acquisition, Google sold Motorola Home Business
for $2.4 billion. Experts analyzing these transactions say that Google was never interested in
Motorola business; what it wanted from the beginning was the Motorola’s Android patents
to protect itself against Apple’s lawsuits2. This paper shows that Google example is not just
an outlier; instead, patents are an important reason for acquisition decisions. Consistent
with this argument, CRA International and K&L Gates North America senior executives
survey finds that 72% of private equity respondents and 85% of corporate respondents agree
that intellectual property (IP) portfolios are equally if not more important than other assets
when evaluating a target (CRA and Gates (2008)).
The patent motivated acquisition channel brings a new complementary perspective to
the existing literature. The previous literature documents that M&As occur for technology
reasons (Betton and Thorburn (2008); Kaplan (2000) and synergies are the main drivers
of these transactions (Andrade and Stafford (2001)). In the traditional view, Holmstrom
and Roberts (1998) discuss that M&A may be conducted because of knowledge transfer.
Complementary knowledge in the target can be used to foster innovation inside the company.
Bena and Li (forth.) shows strong empirical evidence that synergies obtained from combining
2(i)“Google to Sell Motorola Home to Arris for $2.35 Billion”, Bloomberg- Dec20, 2012. (ii)“Google to
Buy Motorola Mobility for $12.5 Billion”, Wall Street Journal.
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innovation capabilities are important drivers of M&A activity. Patent acquisition channel is
distinct from knowledge transfer channel in that companies may already have the knowledge
for production but may only need legal protection against lawsuits.
How does need for legal protection create incentives for M&A? If an alleged infringer
loses the case, it may get an injunction order, which requires it to stop producing prod-
ucts. In addition, the infringer may also need to pay high damage awards or royalty fees3
(see Table 1.11). Besides these direct legal enforcement costs, diminished reputation in the
product markets may yield the infringer to lose its prospective customers. Then, an infringe-
ment decision may lead the infringer to make two different, not mutually exclusive, types of
acquisitions.
On the one hand, since the company may not able to produce its products, a diversifying
acquisition may be optimal for the infringer to access some unrelated industries to find a
new product (Matsusaka (2001)). On the other hand, an infringer may want to conduct
focused M&A to obtain alternative patents to the ones it was found infringing. These
alternative patents may bring important benefits. First, if the infringer can not get a license4
from the patent holder or the license is not on reasonable terms, these acquired alternative
patents may help the firm redesign its products and pursue its production. For example,
Stratasys Ltd. states in SEC filings that5: “claims of intellectual property infringement
successfully asserted against us may require us to redesign infringing technology...”. Second,
335 U.S.C §284: “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”
4Extreme Network Inc. 10-Q (May-2013): “ an adverse court order or a settlement could require us,
among other actions, to: obtain a royalty bearing license to sell or use the relevant technology, and that
license may not be available on reasonable terms or available at all.”
5Stratasys Ltd. 20-F (March-2013).
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even though a company gets a license from the plaintiff, the court’s finding of infringement
increases the conditional probability that alternative patents of other companies are also
infringed. Therefore, infringer may be required to get a license also from other alternative
patent holders. Acquiring a patent portfolio, however, provides the opportunity to make
counterclaims for the possible future plaintiffs. For example, in 2012, Facebook countersued
Yahoo with patents acquired after being sued by Yahoo6.
This paper has several contributions to the literature. First, in this paper, I propose
a new motive for M&A activity: the patent acquisition channel. This channel is distinct
from the traditional knowledge transfer channel. According to the traditional view, buying
patent may not be feasible. After the value of an innovation established, most of the relevant
information is disclosed and a potential buyer may have no incentive to acquire. However, I
show that companies may already have the knowledge but only need legal protection against
lawsuits. Therefore, patent motivated acquisition channel is an important complement to
the previous literature.
Second, to my knowledge, this is the first paper to show a causal effect of how patent
litigations effect M&A market. Especially, given the recent increase in number of patent
litigations, my experiment shows that, in a conservative calculation, this channel explains at
least 4% of all domestic M&A activity. This causal relation is important also for policymak-
ers. In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which brought
the most significant change to the U.S. patent system since 1952 (Matal (2012)). Moreover,
some additional fundamental reforms to the U.S. patent law are still debated (White House
6“Yahoo-Facebook: Brace for the countersuit”, CNN Money, March 13, 2012.
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(2013)). In the midst of these law changes, my results can help policymakers regarding
possible effects of law changes on corporate finance decisions.
Third, this is the first paper to use dissenting judge decisions for identification strat-
egy. Although I used the strategy for patent lawsuits, it can easily be generalized to other
litigations such as antitrust, securities litigations, corporate governance and etc.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview of
institutional details of a patent litigation including patent enforcement and court structure.
Section 1.3 describes the hand collected data and other data sources. Section 1.4 explains
the main hypotheses. Section 1.5 discusses econometric methodology and results. Section
1.6 concludes and Appendix A.4 provides patent law glossary and other patent law related
materials.
1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 What is A Patent?
A patent is a grant by the government, grounded in Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, that gives the patent owner the exclusive right to make, use, offer for sale, sell,
and import the invention described in the patent7 for a specific term8. In essence, a patent
represents a bargain between an inventor and society: in return for inventing something new
and disclosing it to the world, the inventor gets the reward of a temporary monopoly over
735 U.S.C. §271(a)(2000).
8For applications filed on or after June 8, 1995, the patent term is 20 years from the filing date of the
earliest U.S. application to which priority is claimed (excluding provisional applications). For applications
filed before June 8, 1995 and for patents that were still in force on June 8, 1995, the patent term is either
17 years from the issue date or 20 years from the filing date of the earliest U.S. or international (PCT)
application to which priority is claimed (excluding provisional applications), the longer term applying.
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that invention. In order to qualify for a patent, however, an invention must be new, useful,
and not obvious based on what a person skilled in the field of the invention knew at the time
of the invention9. The inventor must also describe to persons skilled in the art how to use
the invention, and must disclose the best mode known to her for using or “practicing” the
invention10.
1.2.2 Patent Enforcement
A patent holder who believes that someone else is making, using, selling, offering for sale, or
importing a product or process that incorporates invention claimed in the patent, can sue
an unauthorized party for infringement of the patent under 35 U.S.C. §281. The patentee
typically seeks both money damages and an injunction11, which stops an infringer producing
infringing product, as well as awards of enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees12 because
of willful infringement. In the patent litigation, accused infringers almost always defense
themselves in 3 ways: i) they allege that the patent claims asserted against them are invalid
for failure to comply with the patent laws, ii) their products are not infringing the underlying
patent and iii) litigated patent is unenforceable because of the patentee’s inequitable conduct
in procuring the patent from the PTO by failing to comply with the duty of candor before
the PTO (Federal Judicial Center, 2009). The details of these defenses can be found in
Section A.1.
935 U.S.C §102, 103.
1035 U.S.C §112
1135 U.S.C §283
1235 U.S.C. §284 and 285
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1.2.3 Patent Litigation
In this section, I will review the possible stages of a patent litigation after plaintiff filed the
initial complaint. All patent infringement suits are initiated in US District Courts. If any
of the parties is not satisfied with the court verdict, then it can appeal to the higher court,
Court of Appeals For the Federal Circuit (CAFC). Depending on the CAFC decision, any of
the parties can request Supreme Court to hear the case. However, the Supreme Court has
discretionary review process which provides the court the authority to decide which appeals
they will consider from among the cases submitted to them. The Supreme Court rejects
to hear the case in more than 98% of all cases appealed to it13, asserting that typically
CAFC decision is final. From the year CAFC established, 1982, to 2012, the Supreme Court
reviewed only 30 patent cases, making an average of 1 case/year. For this reason, CAFC is
generally known as “Supreme Court of Patent Cases”14.
1.2.3.1 Lower Court: US District Courts
In the US, according to 28 U.S.C. §1331 & §1338, federal district courts have exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over patent infringement claims. Therefore, all patent infringement claims
must be filed in federal district courts. Any federal district court in any jurisdiction may
preside over the case, so long as the requirements of personal jurisdiction and venue are
met. On this issue, the Federal Circuit has clarified that for corporate defendants, venue
in a patent case generally exists wherever personal jurisdiction exists15. According to 28
13http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/get-informed/supreme-court/
supreme-court-procedures.aspx
14Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 Univ. of Illinois Law Rev.
387, (“The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . has become the de facto supreme court of patents”)
15VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
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U.S.C. §1391(c), the personal jurisdiction requirement is met if defendants sell, offers to sell
or license a product in the underlying forum. Since majority of the public companies sell
their products in most of the states, practically forum shopping is quite common in district
court level. Table1.17 shows the number of patent infringement claims initiated in each
district court in 2005-2012 period.
1.2.3.2 Upper Court: Court of Appeals For the Federal Circuit (CAFC)
In 1975, the Hruska Commission16 submitted its report (67 F.R.D. 195 [1975]) to Congress
for making a reform that would allow to decrease the number of appeals in the US judical
system. In this report, commissioners stressed a lack of uniformity in U.S. patent law across
the geographical circuits and the resulting practice of forum shopping in patent cases. To
address these problems, the Hruska Commission recommended that a national appeals court
be established to handle patent litigations (67 F.R.D. at 371). Congress responded to these
recommendations with the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 198217, which created the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit18 under Article III of the Constitution
as the sole U.S. appeals court in patent cases.
CAFC is unique among the thirteen U.S. Courts of Appeals because it is the only appel-
late court that has nationwide jurisdiction over certain subject matters19, including patents.
16Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures
17(Pub. L. No. 164, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. [April 2, 1982])
18The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 established two new courts: the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) and the United States Court of Federal Claims while
terminating two courts: the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and the United
States Court of Claims
19It has nationwide jurisdiction in a variety of subject areas, including international trade, government
contracts, patents, trademarks, certain money claims against the United States government, federal per-
sonnel, veterans’ benefits, and public safety officers’ benefits claims. Appeals to the court come from all
federal district courts, the United States Court of Federal Claims, the United States Court of International
Trade, and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. The court also takes appeals of certain
10
Moreover, since there is only one court, any party that is not satisfied with a district court
judgement in a patent litigation should appeal the case to CAFC, which is located in Wash-
ington DC. This structure of CAFC eliminates forum shopping in appellate level for patent
litigations since 1982. The authority of other courts of appeals, which have jurisdiction on
other issues such as bankruptcy etc., however, is restricted by geographic location and thus
there may be differing judicial standards depending on location.
The judges in CAFC are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of
the Senate. Once appointed, justices have life tenure unless they resign, retire, take senior
status, or are removed after impeachment. In the court, twelve judges are appointed for
active service. When eligible, judges may elect to take senior status, which permits them to
continue to serve on the court while handling fewer cases than a judge in active service.
In CAFC, patent infringement appeals are heard by three judge panels, in which judges
are randomly assigned among CAFC judges20. In a panel, verdict is given by the majority
rule (i.e, agreement of 2 judges is sufficient to rise panel’s judgment). If the one of the judges
disagrees with the decision of majority opinion, then he or she can write a dissenting opinion,
which neither creates a binding precedent nor does it become a part of case law. However, a
dissenting opinion may be cited in future cases as a persuasive authority when arguing that
the court’s holding should be limited or overturned. If any of the judges in the panel agrees
with the decision made by the majority of the court, but states different reasons as the basis
for his or her decision, then he or she writes a concurring opinion. In the cases, when no
administrative agencies’ decisions, including the United States Merit Systems Protection Board, the Boards
of Contract Appeals, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, and the Trademark Trial and Appeals
Board. http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html
20http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html
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absolute majority of the court can agree on the basis for deciding the case, the decision of
the court may be contained in a number of concurring opinions, and the concurring opinion
joined by the greatest number of judges is referred as the plurality opinion.
1.3 Hand Collected Dataset
1.3.1 Data Sources
In this paper, I used the following data sources: BloombergLaw, LexMachina, Harvard
Patent Database, The KPSS patent data, CapitalIQ, Compustat, CRSP and SDC M&A.
In the following sections, I will describe the details of each database and explain the filters
used.
1.3.2 Hand Collection of Dissenting Judge Decisions
The main database that I used for court decisions is BloombergLaw, which offers access to
primary legal content, court dockets, legal filings and reports from Bloomberg legal analysts.
I create my initial sample by searching all U.S. CAFC Opinions from the founding year
of CAFC, 1/1/1983, to 12/31/2011 with the keywords “dissent! and patent”. This search
returns 757 court opinions; 662 of these opinions are related with patent law and the rest is
about other type of laws including civil procedure, trademark law, copyright law etc. 199 out
of 658 cases are appeals raised from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) or
International Trade Commission (ITC). Since my interest in this paper is only the appeals
raised from U.S District Courts, I eliminate appeals from the other governmental offices.
This filtering leaves me with 459 court opinions.
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To include into my sample, I read each opinion whether it is a “dispositive” one, which
means that as it leaves the Federal Circuit, at least one claim of one patent is finally adju-
dicated to have been infringed and not invalid or unenforceable (i.e., a win for the patent
owner), or in which it has been finally determined that no claim has these characteristics
(a win for the accused infringer). I include all dispositive decisions of the Federal Circuit,
whether by precedential opinion, nonprecedential opinion, or per curiam affirmance without
opinion under the court Rule 36. Then, I check the history of each case to make sure that
this case was not appealed to the Supreme Court or reheard in an enbanc decision in a later
stage. After excluding non-dissenting decisions and using these filters, I get 202 dispositive
opinions, in which one of the judges have a dissenting opinion. In section 1.3.3, I give some
examples of dispositive and non-dispositive decisions according to the this definition. In
section 1.3.3.1, I provide an example for a dissenting judge decision.
1.3.3 Examples for Dispositive & Non-Dispositive Decisions
• Non-Dispositive: “Applied Medical Resources Corporation (“Applied”) appeals from
a decision of the United States District Court for the Central District of California
granting summary judgment of non-infringement of United States Patent No. 5,385,553
(”the ’553 patent”) in favor of United States Surgical Corporation (”U.S.Surgical”).
See Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., No. SA CV 03-1267 (C.D.Cal.
Mar. 7, 2005) (”Applied Opinion”). Because we conclude that there are genuine issues
of material fact regarding infringement of the ’553 patent given the claim construction
adopted by the district court, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment
13
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
• Non-Dispositive: “Cancer Research Technology Limited and Schering Corporation
(collectively, “Cancer Research”) appeal from the final decision of the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware holding U.S. Patent 5, 260, 291 (“the ‘291
patent”) unenforceable for prosecution laches and inequitable conduct. [**1938] Cancer
Research Tech. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 679 F.Supp.2d 560 (D.Del. 2010). We reverse.”
• Dispositive: “This appeal is from the judgment of the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, Danville Division (Turk, C.J.), in a patent in-
fringement suit brought by Milliken Research Corporation against Dan River, Inc. for
infringement of Milliken’s U.S. Patents Nos. 3,254,510 and 3,277,673, to Lesley. The
district court held both patents (the Lesley patents) invalid for obviousness under 35
U.S.C. Section 103. We affirm.”
• Dispositive: “Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (“Teva”) appeals the final judgment
of the United States District Court of Delaware, which, after a bench trial, found
Merck & Co.’s (“Merck”) U.S. Patent No. 5,994,329 (issued Nov. 30, 1999) (“the
’329 patent”) not invalid as anticipated or obvious. The district court further found
the ’329 patent to be enforceable, and the ’329 patent claims 23 and 37 constructively
infringed by Teva’s Abbreviated New Drug Application (”ANDA”) under 35 U.S.C.
Section 271(e)(2)(A) of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc., 288 F.Supp.2d 601 (D.Del.2003) (“Merck”); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 01-CV-0048, Order (D.Del. Sept. 24, 2003) (Final Judgment
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Order Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) ) (“Final Judgment Order”). We disagree with
the district court’s construction of the claim term “about” in claims 23 and 37 of the
’329 patent. Because we further hold claims 23 and 37 obvious in light of the prior
art, we vacate the judgment of the district court and hold the claims invalid and not
infringed.”
1.3.3.1 An Example of A Dissenting Case in CAFC:
In this section, I will summarize an example of a patent lawsuit21, in which one of the judges
in the panel filed a dissenting opinion. In this case, General American Transportation Corp.
(“GATC”) sues Cryo-Trans, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois to declare that it does not infringe U.S. Patent 4,704,876 (’876). The district court
judge Ruben Castillo, J. ruled that patents are valid, enforceable and GATC infringed the
’876 patent. Having these findings, the judge entered a permanent injunction, prohibiting
GATC using, selling, producing its alleged products and also held GATCH pay Cryo-Trans,
Inc. $8,983,440 in damages.
After the District Court’s finding of infringement, GATC appealed the case claiming
that ’876 patent is invalid and it did not infringe. In the appellate court, the Circuit judges
Mayer, Lourie and Schall were randomly assigned to the case to investigate GATC claims.
The judges Lourie and Schall ruled that patents are valid but GATC did not infringe the
patent. In their majority opinion, they held that in claim construction phase the district
court made an error, which caused an erroneous finding of infringement against GATC.
Given that a patent infringement enforcement requires both patent validity and infringement,
21General American Transportation Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766.
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Lourie and Schall judgement reverses the district court ruling and find that GATC can not
be hold liable for patent infringement. As a consequence, permanent injunction entered
against GATC will be reversed, giving GATC its right back for using, selling, producing
of its alleged products. Moreover, after CAFC finding, GATC is also relieved from paying
Cryo-Trans, Inc. $8,983,440 in damages.
Mayer, the other circuit judge in the panel, however, did not agree with Lourie and
Schall findings. In his dissenting opinion, Mayer discussed that the district court correctly
construed the claim limitation and it also correctly held that GATC infringed the ’876 patent.
In the below, I provide quotes of this dissenting opinion as well as the majority opinion from
the original court document.
Parties: General American Transportation Corp. (Plaintiff-Appellant) & Cryo-Trans, Inc.
(Defendant-Appellee).
Rehearing Availability: Rehearing Denied; Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc Declined.
Judges in the Panel: MAYER, LOURIE, and SCHALL, Circuit Judges.
Result: Judgment Affirmed (In Part), Judgment Reversed (In Part)
Summary: “General American Transportation Corp. (“GATC”) appeals from the judg-
ment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in which the
court held GATC liable for patent infringement, awarded Cryo-Trans, Inc. $8,983,440 in
damages, and entered a permanent injunction against GATC. General Am. Transp. Corp.
v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 1121 (N.D.Ill.1995); General Am. Transp. Corp. v.
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Cryo-Trans, Inc., 893 F.Supp. 774 (N.D.Ill.1995). Because the court correctly held that
the patent was not proved invalid, but misconstrued the claims and clearly erred in finding
infringement, we affirm in part and reverse in part.”
Conclusion: “The district court erred as a matter of law in construing the claims and
clearly erred in finding infringement. Accordingly, the court’s decision finding infringement,
awarding damages, and entering a permanent injunction is reversed. Its conclusion concern-
ing validity is affirmed.”
Majority Opinion: LOURIE, Circuit Judge, writes the majority opinion and SCHALL,
Circuit Judge, joins.
“...GATC argues that the district court misconstrued the claim language “openings through
said ceiling means adjacent to each of said side walls and end walls,” which led to a clearly
erroneous finding of infringement. We agree. As explained below, the district court incor-
rectly held that openings “adjacent” to the side walls could also be considered to be openings
“adjacent” to the end walls. That error led to a clearly erroneous finding of infringement.
To ascertain the meaning of the claims, we consider the claim language, the specification,
and the prosecution history. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979, 34 USPQ2d at 1329. Here, the
claim language itself distinguishes between the openings that are adjacent to the side walls
and those that are adjacent to the end walls. Specifically, the claims require “openings ...
adjacent each of said side walls and end walls,” which suggests that the openings adjacent
to the side walls are structurally distinct from the openings adjacent to the end walls. The
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district court’s claim construction obliterated that distinction...”
Dissenting Opinion: MAYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
“The district court correctly construed the only claim limitation in dispute: “[T]he term
‘adjacent’ as used in the ‘876 patent means ‘not far off.’ ” The court then found that the
openings nearest the end walls of General American Transportation Corporation’s (GATC)
accused railcar were “adjacent” to those walls and therefore literally infringed the claim. I
see no error in claim construction or in the finding of infringement....”
1.4 Hypotheses Development
1.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Does an alleged infringer increase focused
(diversified) acquisitions after losing the lawsuit?
Why does the outcome of an infringement lawsuit drive a firm to make a focused or diversifed
acquisition? The main rational for this hypothesis is that if an alleged infringer loses the case,
it may get an injunction order, which requires it to stop producing products. In addition,
the infringer may also need to pay high damage awards or royalty fees22 (see Table 1.11).
Besides these direct legal enforcement costs, diminished reputation in the product markets
may yield the infringer to lose its prospective customers. Then, an infringement decision
may lead the infringer to make two different, not mutually exclusive, types of acquisitions.
On the one hand, since the company may not able to produce its products, a diversifying
acquisition may be optimal for the infringer to access some unrelated industries to find a new
2235 U.S.C §284: “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”
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product. On the other hand, an infringer may want to conduct focused M&A to increase
its market power or obtain alternative patents to the ones it was found infringing. Making
both diversifying and focused acquisitions simultaneously may not be optimal since excessive
acquisition may distract company management in its existing projects.
1.4.2 Hypothesis2: Does possible target’s having alternative patents
increase chance to be acquired?
In this hypothesis, I test whether court’s finding of infringement induce companies to make
patent motivated acquisitions, in which targets have alternative technology patents. The
main rational for this hypothesis is that after finding of infringement, companies may need to
stop producing the infringing products or redesign them by acquiring alternative technology
patents. These alternative patents may bring important benefits. First, if the infringer
can not get a license23 from the patent holder or the license is not on reasonable terms,
companies may choose to obtain similar technology patents. For example, QIWI states in
SEC filings24 that : “if we cannot or do not license the infringed technology on reasonable
terms or substitute similar technology from another source, our revenue and earnings could
be adversely impacted”. These acquired alternative patents may help the firm redesign its
products and pursue its production. For example, Stratasys Ltd. states in SEC filings that25:
“claims of intellectual property infringement successfully asserted against us may require us
to redesign infringing technology...”.
23Extreme Network Inc. 10-Q (May-2013): “ an adverse court order or a settlement could require us,
among other actions, to: obtain a royalty bearing license to sell or use the relevant technology, and that
license may not be available on reasonable terms or available at all.”
24QIWI Form 424B4 filed on May 03, 2013
25Stratasys Ltd. 20-F (March-2013).
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Second, acquiring a patent provides an important benefit that licensing from plaintiff
or other patent holders does not. A license, is only a promise by the patent owner (the
licensor) not to sue the licensee for exercising one of the patent owner’s rights. However,
due to uncertainty in claim construction explained in section A.1.2, the court’s finding of
infringement increases the conditional probability that alternative patents of other companies
are also infringed. Therefore, infringer may be required to get a license also from each of
the other alternative patent holders. Acquiring a patent portfolio, however, provides the
opportunity to make counterclaims for the possible future plaintiffs. For example, in 2012,
Facebook countersued Yahoo with patents acquired after being sued by Yahoo26.
1.5 Empirical Section
In this section, first I will explain the data collection process for matching alleged infringer
names to Compustat database. Then, I will provide the rational for hypotheses and their
empirical tests.
1.5.1 Collecting Alleged Infringer Information & Summary Statis-
tics
The main problem is in matching alleged infringers to Compustat database is that there is no
identifier for the parties in the court documents. Simple name matching is also problematic:
sometimes companies use very different abbreviations for their names. In addition, some of
the companies change their names at some point in time and, more problematically, some
unrelated companies gather these names. Therefore, even a good name matching algorithm
26“Yahoo-Facebook: Brace for the countersuit”, CNN Money, March 13, 2012.
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that would take into account misspelling and abbreviations may match alleged infringers to
unrelated companies.
To overcome these problems, specifically, I hand-match the alleged infringers names with
the S&P CapitalIQ. This database has several benefits: first, it assigns each company a
unique identifier and tracks all the previous names; second, it provides basic business de-
scription for each company. Therefore, I start my data construction by searching CapitalIQ
for all companies that used the underlying alleged infringer name at some point in time.
In some cases, I get different companies that are operating in very different industries but
used the same or similar name in their life cycle. To find the appropriate match, I read the
descriptions of patents in the lawsuit and business description of the companies to make sure
that I correctly match. I also double check from LexMechina database if there exists any
court document that has ownership document about the parties.
After matching alleged infringer names with S&P CapitalIQ unique identifiers, I drop
companies that have another case decision in the 2 year interval. This filtering provides me
to directly see unconfounded effect of each litigation. Then, to be able to match my sample
with other standard databases, I use CapitalIQ-Gvkey identifier information in WRDS to
get gvkey for each company at the time of the court decision. After getting gvkey for each
of the firms, my sample has 63 public companies in the treatment sample (losers) and 48
companies in the control sample (winner). Table2.1 shows the summary statistics for the
resulting sample. In treatment group, companies have an average assets value of $20.18
bil, while companies in the control group have $19.75 bil. Both groups also have similar
capital structure ratios: capital expenditure/asset, leverage and cash ratio are 0.13, 0.238
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and 0.09 in treatment group while control group has 0.15, 0.224 and 0.116, respectively.
The last column in Table2.1 show the t-statistics for the difference of each of these ratios.
Each difference is insignificant; therefore, control and treatment samples are appropriate for
hypothesis testing.
1.5.2 Pre-Hypothesis Testing: Examining Parallel Trends Assump-
tion
To make an inference in treatment-effects framework, control and treatment samples should
behave similarly in the period prior to the treatment event (the parallel trends assumption).
To test for parallel trends, I compare pre-existing changes and levels of my outcome variables
across firms in the control and treatment groups. Specifically, I regress levels at time (t-1)
and changes in the outcome variables from time (t-1) to (t-2) to treatment dummy and
firm control variables. Finding a significant coefficient in treatment dummy would mean
that the necessary condition is violated. Table1.3 shows the regression results; there is
no significant pre-existing differences in either changes or levels of the outcome variables,
which are quarterly spending on focused and diversifying acquisitions both scaled by assets.
Therefore, in my sample, parallel trends condition is not violated.
1.5.3 Hypothesis Testing
1.5.3.1 Testing Hypothesis 1: Does an alleged infringer increase focused (di-
versified) acquisitions after losing the lawsuit?
To test hypothesis, first I gather all completed domestic M&As available on SDC’s U.S. Merg-
ers and Acquisitions Database between 1983-2012 period. I limit my analysis to transactions
with an explicit change of control: The acquirer must purchase 50% or more of the target’s
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shares in the transaction and own less than 50% of the target prior to the transaction. For
each target and acquirer, I gather primary 4-digit SIC code of the company.
For the experimenal setup, I use difference-in-difference (DID) and fixed effects regres-
sions in 4 quarters interval of court announcement date for each alleged infringer. In DID
specification shown in Equation(1.1), the dependant variable refers to the amount that al-
leged infringer i spent on focused acquisition scaled by its total assets in the quarter t . As
in Bena and Li (forth.) and Arikan and Stulz (2011), I define acquisitions in which acquirer
and target are in the same 2-digit SIC code as focused acquisition (i.e, related) and define
others as diversifying acquisitions. In this specification, Loseri is a binary variable that
takes a value of 1 if alleged infringer lost the case (i.e, found infringing) and takes 0 if it
won (i.e, prevailed). Aftert is a binary variable denoting whether the underlying quarter
is after the court announcement date. Aftert × Loseri is interaction of After and Loser.
γT is a year fixed effect and Xi,t is quarterly control variables including lagged cash, lagged
leverage, R&D, book-to-market (B/M), capital expenditures, return on assets (ROA), return
on equity (ROE) and logarithm of assets.
Focused Acq Amounti,t
Total Assetsi,t
= λ(Aftert×Loseri)+β(Aftert)+δ(Loseri)+ϕXi,t+γT+εi,t (1.1)
Diversifying Acq Amounti,t
Total Assetsi,t
= λ(Aftert×Loseri)+β(Aftert)+δ(Loseri)+ϕXi,t+γT +εi,t
(1.2)
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Table 1.4 shows the regression results of Equation (1.1). The interaction term Aftert ×
Loseri is statistically significant at 5% level. This result shows that if the court gives an
infringement decision, then the infringer increases spending on focused M&A by 0.6% of its
total assets in the subsequent year. In 2012, the total assets of the companies that lost a
case in CAFC was more than $ 4tril. Therefore, patent litigations induced firms to increase
its focused acquisitions by $24 bil./year. In 2012, domestic focused acquisitions was $294bil.
and total domestic M&A activity was $585 bil. According to these statistics, even in this
conservative estimation, patent infringement explain around 8.1% of focused M&A and 4.1%
of all domestic M&A activity.
Next, I investigate whether losing a case has any effect on diversifying acquisitions. For
infringers, a diversifying acquisition may be optimal since it may provide to access some
unrelated industries to find a new product. However, given the exogenous increase in focused
acquisitions (Table 1.4), infringers may choose to decrease diversifying acquisitions. Table
1.5 shows the regression results of equation (1.2), which is same as equation (1.1) except
the dependant variable gauges the ratio of diversifying acquisitions instead of the ratio of
focused acquisitions over assets. I find that after finding of infringement, companies decrease
diversifying M&A by 0.24% in the subsequent year. Therefore, my overall results in DID
specifications show that after finding of infringement, companies increase focused acquisitions
and decrease diversifying acquisitions.
Focus Acq Amounti,t
Total Assetsi,t
= β(Aftert) + ϕXi,t + γT + αi + εi,t (1.3)
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Given that DID specification does not allow to use firm fixed effects due to multicollinear-
ity, as a robustness test, I run fixed effect regressions for loser and winners separately as in
equation (1.3). This specification helps to control time-invariant unobservable characteristics
of each company and shows the effect of the court decision. One problem with fixed effect
regression is that it does not capture time-varying unobservable variables. However, since
analysis is conducted in 4 quarter interval of court decision date, the concern is minimal
in this experimental setup. In equation (1.3), Aftert is a binary variable denoting whether
the underlying quarter is after the court announcement date, αi is the firm fixed effects and
and Xi,t is quarterly control variables including lagged cash, leverage, R&D, Book to Market
(B/M), Capital Expenditures, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and loga-
rithm of assets. Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 shows the regression results of Eqn. (1.3) for losers
and winners, respectively. The results are consistent with DID results. Table 1.6 shows that
there is an increase in focused acquisition for losers. However, there is insignificant negative
effect for winners as demonstrated in Table 1.7.
1.5.3.2 Testing Hypothesis2: Does possible target’s having alternative patents
increase chance to be acquired?
To test the hypothesis, I use conditional logit regressions as in equation (1.4). In this
specification, for each acquirer- actual target pair, I create three acquirer-control target
pairs. Control targets are propensity score matches of actual target by size and B/M for
the same 4-digit SIC industries and year. Similar to data collection process employed in
section 1.5.3.1, I gather all completed domestic M&As available on SDC’s U.S. Mergers and
Acquisitions Database between 1983-2012 period. I limit my analysis to transactions with
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an explicit change of control: The acquirer must purchase 50% or more of the target’s shares
in the transaction and own less than 50% of the target prior to the transaction.
Acquirer−Targetijm,t = α+β1Alternative Patent+β2Tech Overlap+β3Xi,t+β4Yj,t+γm+εijm,t
(1.4)
In equation (1.4), Acquirer−Targetijm,t takes the value of 1 if firm j is an actual target
of acquirer i in deal m. It takes the value of zero if firm j is a matched target. γm is deal
fixed effect. In this specification, Tech Overlap refers to different patent based measures
to gauge research similarity among two firm. These measures are defined in Bena and Li
(forth.); and I explain in section A.3.2. To derive patent-based measures, it is standard to use
NBER Patent Database. However, this dataset has coverage for public company patents only
from 1976 to 2006. Therefore, in this paper, I use two complementary databases that have
coverage until 2010: KPSS Patent Database and Harvard Patent Database. KPSS, which
was introduced in Kogan and Stoffman (2012), covers all patents granted between 1926
and 2010 and has information about unique patent number granted by USPTO and CRSP
unique identifier permno. I use gvkey-permno linking table in WRDS to associate patents
to companies and extract firm level information from Compustat database. Next, using the
unique USPTO patent numbers, I merge all patents with Harvard Patent Database, which
has detailed information about citing patents, patent main classes and patent subclasses.
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After this merge operation, for each infringer, I identify the Alternative Patent. I define a
patent an alternative if two patents are in the same main classification and also in the same
for half of subclassifications.
For the experiment, I use M&A transactions of alleged infringers in the subsequent year
to court announcement date. Since patent databases cover only public companies, I restrict
my sample to public company targets. Table 1.9 presents the estimates of conditional logit
regressions. The variable of interest in this table is the Alternative Patent. Panel A shows
the coefficient estimates for alleged infringers for losers and Panel B shows the estimates for
winners. The Panel A coefficient estimates for Alternative Patent in Column(I) is statis-
tically significant at 1% level. This result shows that target’s having an alternative patent
increases its chance to be acquired by an acquirer who has recently lost in a lawsuit. In
Panel A, I also control for different Tech Overlap measures that may provide synergy for
the acquisition. My results are consistent with Bena and Li (forth.); technology overlap
between acquirer and target increase the likelihood of acquisition. In these regressions, esti-
mated coefficient of alternative patent measure is also significant and fosters the argument
that accessing alternative patent is an important reason for acquisition for losers.
As a robustness test, I make the same analysis in Panel A for the alleged infringers who
prevailed in the case. Given that these companies do not infringe a patent and has the
right to pursue production, I do not expect these companies to conduct M&A for accessing
alternative patents. Panel B in Table 1.9 shows the results: consistent with my hypothesis,
coefficient estimate of Alternative Patent is insignificant and different technology overlap
measures are statistically significant in 1% and 10% levels.
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1.5.3.3 Is there market reaction differences in focused vs diversifying M&A
for winners vs. losers?
This hypothesis investigates whether there exists difference in market reaction to focused
and diversifying M&A that were conducted after the court announcement. To test this
hypothesis, I use the regression equation in (1.5). In this specification, Focusedi,j is a dummy
variable indicating whether the transaction j of the acquirer i is a focused acquisition. I
define acquisitions in which acquirer and target are in the same 2-digit SIC code as focused
acquisition (i.e, related) and define others as diversifying acquisitions. Loseri is a binary
variable that takes a value of 1 if alleged infringer is in the treatment group (i.e, found
infringing) and takes 0 if an alleged infringer is in the control group (i.e, prevailed in the
case). Focusedi,j×Loseri is the interaction term calculated by multiplication of loser dummy
and focused dummy. Zi,j refers to M&A control variables consisting of transaction value (in
$mil), target public status dummy, all cash dummy, acquirer market capitalization and
relative size (transaction value divided by the equity market capitalization of the acquirer
at the end of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement).
AbnormalReturni,j = β0 + β1(Focusedi,j ×Loseri) + β2Focusedi,j + β3Loseri + β4Zi,j + εi,j
(1.5)
To calculate abnormal returns, I use three different approaches: value-weighted, equal-
weighted and market model. In value-weighted (equal-weighted) approach, the abnormal
returns results after subtracting the return of the CRSP value-weighted (equal-weighted)
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from market index from day t = -1 to day t= +1 where t = 0 is the acquisition announcement
date. In the market model, the abnormal return is calculated by subtracting return from
market-based estimate. The parameters for the market model are estimated over the (-205,
-6) interval.
I eliminate transactions that has value less than $1mil. or size of the transaction is less
than 1% of equity market capitalization of the acquirer at the end of the fiscal year prior
to the acquisition announcement. In Eqn.(1.5), our variable of interest is the coefficient
estimate of the interaction term, Focusedi,j × Loseri . Table 1.10 shows the results: the
coefficient of interaction term in value-weighted model is %0.26 and statistically significant
at 1% level. These results demonstrate that after court’s finding of infringement, the effort
of infringers for accessing alternative technologies is valued by the financial markets.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the causal effects of patent litigations on M&A activity. Specifi-
cally, I ask the following questions: Does losing in a patent litigation cause an alleged infringer
to make particular type of acquisitions (i.e, focused vs. diversifying)? If it does, what are the
explicit transmission mechanisms? I find that if the court finds a patent infringement, then
the infringer sharply increases spending on focused acquisitions and decrease spending on
diversifying acquisitions. Moreover, I also find that the infringer specifically conducts patent
motivated acquisitions, in which it acquires targets that have alternative patents to the ones
it was found infringing. Acquired alternative patents provide the infringer the opportunity
to redesign its products or form a shield against future lawsuits. The litigation caused ac-
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quisitions explain a sizable portion of the overall M&A activity; a conservative calculation
demonstrates that these results explain around 8% of all focused acquisitions and around
4% of all domestic M&A transactions.
For identification strategy, I propose a unique experimental setting that exploits the
institutional details of the patent court system. In U.S., a patent infringement claim is
initiated in U.S. district courts. If any of the parties is not satisfied with district court
decision, then it can appeal to the higher court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC). It is the only appellate court for patent cases and has federal jurisdiction. In
CAFC, cases are heard by randomly assigned 3-judge panels. The decision is given by
the majority rule and the judges in the panel can dissent by writing a dissenting opinion.
For my experiment, I hand collect detailed data for all cases with a dissenting judge (i.e.,
decisions was given by 2 to 1) to assign alleged infringers to treatment and control groups.
The dissenting judge cases are rare; they make less than 0.4% of patent lawsuit universe.
Therefore, I argue that assignment of alleged infringer to experiment groups is close to
random and my estimations establish a causal relation.
This paper has several contributions to the literature. First, in this paper, I propose
a new motive for M&A activity: the patent acquisition channel. This channel is distinct
from the traditional knowledge transfer channel. According to the traditional view, buying
patent may not be feasible. After the value of an innovation established, most of the relevant
information is disclosed and a potential buyer may have no incentive to acquire. However, I
show that companies may already have the knowledge but only need legal protection against
lawsuits. Therefore, patent motivated acquisition channel is an important complement to
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the previous literature.
Second, to my knowledge, this is the first paper to show a causal effect of how patent
litigations effect M&A market. Especially, given the recent increase in number of patent
litigations, my experiment shows that, in a conservative calculation, this channel explains at
least 4% of all domestic M&A activity. This causal relation is important also for policymak-
ers. In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which brought
the most significant change to the U.S. patent system since 1952 (Matal (2012)). Moreover,
some additional fundamental reforms to the U.S. patent law are still debated (White House
(2013)). In the midst of these law changes, my results can help policymakers regarding
possible effects of law changes on corporate finance decisions.
Third, this is the first paper to use dissenting judge decisions for identification strat-
egy. Although I used the strategy for patent lawsuits, it can easily be generalized to other
litigations such as antitrust, securities litigations, corporate governance and etc.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1:
Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the Control and Treatment groups used in this study. Control
group consist of alleged infringers who prevailed in a dispositive decision in CAFC during 1983-2011 period.
Treatment group consist of alleged infringers who was found infringing at least a patent in a dispositive
opinion in the same period. Similar to Janicke (2006), I define a case dispositive if it satisfies the following
conditions: i) as it leaves the Federal Circuit, at least one claim of one patent is finally adjudicated to
have been infringed and not invalid or unenforceable (i.e., a win for the patent owner); ii) it has been
finally determined that no claim has these characteristics (a win for the accused infringer). I include all
dispositive decisions of the Federal Circuit, whether by precedential opinion, nonprecedential opinion, or per
curiam affirmance without opinion under the courts Rule 36. Definitions of the variables are provided in the
Appendix A.3.
Treatment Control Difference (t-stat)
Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std.
Assets($bil) 20.18 16.00 19.06 19.75 13.34 19.64 (0.76)
Leverage .238 .223 .238 .224 .245 .120 (0.75)
Cash Ratio .093Aˆ .081 .080 .116 081 .103 (-0.92)
Book-to-Market .389 .329 .369 .346 .328 .208 (0.67)
R&D Ratio .079 .072 .048 .089 .079 .065 (-0.95)
ROA .015 .017 .022 .012 .013 .025 (0.64)
ROE .039 .043 .035 .038 .040 .062 (0.01)
Number of Firms 63 48
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Table 1.2:
Summary Statistics- Actual vs. Matched Targets
This table reports summary statistics of the target firms specified in Eqn 1.4. Actual target refers to ac-
quisitions of alleged infringers in the subsequent 3 year to court announcement date. Control targets are
propensity score matches of actual target by size and B/M for the same 4-digit SIC industries and year.
The variable descriptions are as follows: Assets = ATQ. Book Leverage = Total Debt / Book Assets =
(DLCQ+DLTTQ) / ATQ. Cash = Cash / Book Assets = CHEQ / ATQ. R&D = Research and development
expenses (XRDQ) / lagged total assets(ATQ). Return on Assets (ROA) = Operating income before depre-
ciation (OIBDPQ) / lagged total assets (ATQ). Return on Equity (ROE) =Income before extraordinary
items/one-quarter-lagged book equity= IBQ/SEQQ.
Actual Control
N Mean Median Std. N Mean Median Std.
Assets($mil) 100 3260.17 202.24 8674.25 300 3115.98 168.70 8764.59
Leverage 97 .231 .086 .436 289 .226 .158 .296
Cash Ratio 100 .333Aˆ .267 .281 296 .258 .144 .277
Book-to-Market 100 .505 .392 1.46 200 .504 .393 1.12
R&D Ratio 77 .048 .028 .091 185 .044 .025 .056
ROA 99 .003 .007 .109 286 .002 .005 .121
ROE 99 .003 .019 .212 286 .005 .015 1.61
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Table 1.3:
Pre-Existing differences in outcome variables for treatment and control groups.
This table reports results on pre-existing differences in outcome variables for treatment (loser) and control
(winner) groups. Panel A reports results on differences in pre-existing changes (“trends”) in these variables,
and Panel B reports results on differences in levels. The first and second columns reports results for amount
spent for focused and diversified acquisition scaled by assets. I define acquisitions in which acquirer and
target are in the same 2-digit SIC code as focused acquisition and define others as diversifying acquisitions.
In the regression t=0 refers to the court announcement quarter and t=-1 is the quarter before the court
announcement date. Loseri is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if alleged infringer is in the treatment
group (i.e, found infringing) and takes 0 if an alleged infringer is in the control group (i.e, prevailed in the
case). In each regression, I control company characteristics summarized in Table2.1. T-statistics shown in
parenthesis and *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Dependant Variable: Focused Acq./Asset Diversifying Acq./Asset
(I) (II)
PANEL A: Changes (t-2 to t-1)
Loser 0.016 -0.061
(0.38) (-0.46)
Company Controls Yes Yes
R2 4.3% 2.1%
N 94 94
PANEL B: Levels (t-1)
Loser 0.050 -0.01
(0.15) (-0.27)
Company Controls Yes Yes
R2 5.3% 4.1%
N 94 94
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Table 1.4:
Do Losers Make More Focused Acquisitions? (Diff-in-Diff)
This table presents results illustrating the relationship between outcome of a patent litigation and alleged
infringer’s focused M&A activity in 4 quarters interval of the court announcement date. The exact speci-
fication is defined in Eq.(1.1). In this DID regression, the coefficient estimates shows the estimates of the
average change in focused acquisitions for control(winner) and treatment (loser) groups. The dependant
variable refers to the ratio of amount that alleged infringer spent on focused acquisition scaled to the firm’s
total assets. I define acquisitions in which acquirer and target are in the same 2-digit SIC code as focused
acquisition and define others as diversifying acquisitions. In this specification, Loseri is a binary variable
that takes a value of 1 if alleged infringer is in the treatment group (i.e, found infringing) and takes 0 if
an alleged infringer is in the control group (i.e, prevailed in the case). Control group consist of all alleged
infringers who prevailed in a dispositive decision in CAFC during 1983-2011 period. Treatment group consist
of alleged infringers who was found infringing at least a patent in a dispositive opinion in the same period.
Similar to Janicke (2006), I define a case dispositive if it satisfies the following conditions: i) as it leaves the
Federal Circuit, at least one claim of one patent is finally adjudicated to have been infringed and not invalid
or unenforceable (i.e., a win for the patent owner); ii) it has been finally determined that no claim has these
characteristics (a win for the accused infringer). I include all dispositive decisions of the Federal Circuit,
whether by precedential opinion, nonprecedential opinion, or per curiam affirmance without opinion under
the courts Rule 36. Aftert is a binary variable denoting whether the underlying quarter is after the court
announcement date. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 1.4:
Continued
Dependent Variable: Focused Acquisition Amount/Assets (in percentages)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Loser ×After 0.150** 0.087** 0.103** 0.105** 0.104** 0.103** 0.089** 0.106**
(2.12) (2.15) (2.08) (2.20) (2.10) (2.09) (2.31) (2.16)
Loser -0.013 -0.017 -0.008 -0.017 -0.014 -0.013 -0.003 -0.015
(-0.36) (-0.61) (-0.22) (-0.49) (-0.39) (-0.36) (-0.11) (-0.44)
After -0.023 -0.013 -0.025 -0.023 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.023
(-0.74) (-0.51) (-0.81) (-0.78) (-0.72) (-0.72) (-0.89) (-0.76)
R&D 0.466** 0.332 0.407* 0.428* 0.467** 0.380** 0.415**
(2.08) (1.57) (1.88) (1.94) (2.09) (2.31) (2.13)
Sales/Assets 0.257* 0.187* 0.217 0.252* 0.243* 0.235** 0.260*
(1.79) (1.84) (1.57) (1.75) (1.70) (1.98) (1.90)
Capex/Assets -1.236 -1.011 -1.051 -1.237 -1.225 -1.044* -1.188
(-1.61) (-1.55) (-1.38) (-1.61) (-1.60) (-1.69) (-1.56)
ROA 0.754 0.703 0.697 0.767 0.277 0.555 0.588
(0.94) (1.15) (0.87) (0.97) (0.47) (1.21) (0.79)
ROE -0.263 -0.171 -0.204 -0.264 -0.077 -0.052 -0.244
(-0.89) (-0.79) (-0.69) (-0.93) (-0.35) (-0.30) (-0.83)
B/M -0.077 -0.057 -0.086* -0.073 -0.082* -0.067 -0.072
(-1.59) (-1.52) (-1.78) (-1.61) (-1.71) (-1.43) (-1.52)
Log(Assets) -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.33) (-0.73) (-0.86) (-0.15) (-0.19) (-0.34) (-0.46)
Cash/Assets -0.055 0.064 -0.045 -0.028 -0.017 -0.043 -0.014
(-0.46) (0.70) (-0.38) (-0.24) (-0.16) (-0.36) (-0.17)
N 387 571 387 401 387 387 505 389
AdjR2 0.026 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.027 0.027 0.023 0.030
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 1.5:
Do Losers Make More Diversifying Acquisitions? (Diff-in-Diff)
This table presents results illustrating the relationship between outcome of a patent litigation and alleged
infringer’s diversifying M&A activity in 4 quarters interval of the court announcement date. The exact
specification is defined in Eq.(1.2). In this DID regression, the coefficient estimates shows the estimates
of the average change in diversifying acquisitions for control(winner) and treatment (loser) groups. The
dependant variable refers to the ratio of amount that alleged infringer spent on diversifying acquisition
scaled to the firm’s total assets. I define acquisitions in which acquirer and target are not in the same 2-digit
SIC code as diversifying acquisitions. In this specification, Loseri is a binary variable that takes a value of
1 if alleged infringer is in the treatment group (i.e, found infringing) and takes 0 if an alleged infringer is in
the control group (i.e, prevailed in the case). Control group consist of all alleged infringers who prevailed in
a dispositive decision in CAFC during 1983-2011 period. Treatment group consist of alleged infringers who
was found infringing at least a patent in a dispositive opinion in the same period. Similar to Janicke (2006), I
define a case dispositive if it satisfies the following conditions: i) as it leaves the Federal Circuit, at least one
claim of one patent is finally adjudicated to have been infringed and not invalid or unenforceable (i.e., a win
for the patent owner); ii) it has been finally determined that no claim has these characteristics (a win for the
accused infringer). I include all dispositive decisions of the Federal Circuit, whether by precedential opinion,
nonprecedential opinion, or per curiam affirmance without opinion under the courts Rule 36. Aftert is a
binary variable denoting whether the underlying quarter is after the court announcement date. Definitions
of the variables are provided in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 1.5:
Continued
Dependent Variable: Diversified Acquisition Amount/Assets (in percentages))
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Loser ×After -0.062** -0.056** -0.062** -0.061** -0.063** -0.064** -0.038** -0.059**
(-2.25) (-2.30) (-2.18) (-2.16) (-2.12) (-2.17) (-2.10) (-2.13)
Loser -0.004 0.017 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.020 -0.010
(-0.15) (0.85) (-0.13) (-0.19) (-0.22) (-0.15) (-0.81) (-0.42)
After 0.053** 0.043** 0.053** 0.052** 0.054** 0.054** 0.019 0.052**
(2.32) (2.28) (2.32) (2.32) (2.35) (2.35) (0.89) (2.29)
R&D 0.034 0.022 0.041 -0.028 0.035 -0.064 -0.040
(0.20) (0.14) (0.26) (-0.17) (0.21) (-0.42) (-0.27)
Sales/Assets 0.023 -0.021 0.028 0.015 0.002 -0.086 0.012
(0.22) (-0.29) (0.27) (0.14) (0.02) (-0.78) (0.12)
Capex/Assets 0.288 0.192 0.305 0.286 0.304 0.281 0.322
(0.50) (0.41) (0.54) (0.50) (0.53) (0.49) (0.57)
ROA 1.202** 0.891** 1.196** 1.187** 0.502 0.711* 1.024*
(2.02) (2.03) (2.01) (2.03) (1.13) (1.68) (1.84)
ROE -0.386* -0.224 -0.381* -0.378* -0.090 -0.160 -0.361*
(-1.76) (-1.45) (-1.75) (-1.81) (-0.55) (-0.98) (-1.66)
B/M 0.012 0.021 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.026 0.014
(0.32) (0.76) (0.30) (0.30) (0.09) (0.73) (0.38)
Log(Assets) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(-0.02) (0.05) (-0.09) (-0.11) (0.28) (-0.03) (0.21)
Cash/Assets -0.075 -0.062 -0.074 -0.079 -0.015 -0.057 -0.007
(-0.85) (-0.96) (-0.84) (-0.93) (-0.18) (-0.65) (-0.09)
N 387 571 387 401 387 387 505 389
AdjR2 0.010 0.003 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.013
Y earDummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 1.6:
Do Losers Make More Focused Acquisitions? (Fixed Effect Specification For
Losers)
This table presents results illustrating the relationship between outcome of a patent litigation and loser’s (i.e,
who was found infringing in the court) focused M&A activity in 4 quarters interval of the court announcement
date. The exact specification is defined in Eq.(1.3). In this specification, the coefficient estimates shows the
estimates of the average change in focused acquisitions for loser controlling for time-invariant unobservable
characteristics by firm fixed effects. The dependant variable refers to the ratio of amount that infringer
spent on focused acquisition scaled to the firm’s total assets. I define acquisitions in which acquirer and
target are in the same 2-digit SIC code as focused acquisition and define others as diversifying acquisitions.
Losers consist of all alleged infringers who were found infringing at least a patent in a dispositive opinion in
1983-2011 period. I include all dispositive decisions of the Federal Circuit, whether by precedential opinion,
nonprecedential opinion, or per curiam affirmance without opinion under the courts Rule 36. Aftert is a
binary variable denoting whether the underlying quarter is after the court announcement date. Definitions
of the variables are provided in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 1.6:
Continued
Dependent Variable: Focused Acquisition Amount/Assets (in percentages))
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
After 0.100** 0.078** 0.092* 0.101** 0.099** 0.098** 0.072* 0.080*
(2.03) (2.08) (1.88) (2.15) (2.03) (2.04) (1.82) (1.85)
R&D 1.438 1.722 1.177 1.497 1.359 1.375 1.363
(1.21) (1.47) (1.05) (1.63) (1.23) (1.36) (1.13)
Sales/Assets 1.056 0.683 1.015 1.029 1.063 0.930 0.924
(1.26) (1.57) (1.27) (1.35) (1.27) (1.28) (1.09)
Capex/Assets -1.541 -1.482 -1.409 -1.548 -1.538 -1.243 -1.463
(-1.02) (-1.25) (-0.93) (-1.03) (-1.02) (-0.99) (-0.96)
ROA -0.212 -0.982 1.155 -0.431 -0.543 -0.176 0.599
(-0.08) (-0.53) (0.47) (-0.17) (-0.27) (-0.08) (0.22)
ROE -0.118 0.129 -0.154 -0.094 -0.151 -0.109 -0.196
(-0.19) (0.23) (-0.24) (-0.16) (-0.32) (-0.21) (-0.31)
B/M 0.014 0.013 -0.038 0.034 0.008 0.029 -0.018
(0.06) (0.07) (-0.18) (0.16) (0.04) (0.14) (-0.08)
Cash/Assets 0.937** 0.738* 0.892* 0.917** 0.932** 0.942** 0.767*
(2.03) (1.76) (1.93) (2.04) (2.05) (2.05) (1.95)
N 151 232 151 159 151 151 182 151
AdjR2 0.082 0.052 0.069 0.072 0.082 0.082 0.067 0.050
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 1.7:
Do Winners Make More Focused Acquisitions? (Fixed Effect Specification For
Winners)
This table presents results illustrating the relationship between outcome of a patent litigation and winner’s
(i.e, the alleged infringer who prevailed in the court) focused M&A activity in 4 quarters interval of the
court announcement date. The exact specification is defined in Eq.(1.3). In this specification, the coefficient
estimates shows the estimates of the average change in focused acquisitions of winner controlling for time-
invariant unobservable characteristics by firm fixed effects. The dependant variable refers to the ratio of
amount that infringer spent on focused acquisition scaled to the firm’s total assets. I define acquisitions
in which acquirer and target are in the same 2-digit SIC code as focused acquisition and define others as
diversifying acquisitions. Winners consist of all alleged infringers who prevailed in a dispositive decision in
CAFC during 1983-2011 period. I define a case dispositive if it satisfies the following conditions: i) as it
leaves the Federal Circuit, at least one claim of one patent is finally adjudicated to have been infringed and
not invalid or unenforceable (i.e., a win for the patent owner); ii) it has been finally determined that no claim
has these characteristics (a win for the accused infringer). I include all dispositive decisions of the Federal
Circuit, whether by precedential opinion, nonprecedential opinion, or per curiam affirmance without opinion
under the courts Rule 36. Aftert is a binary variable denoting whether the underlying quarter is after the
court announcement date. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix A.3. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 1.7:
Continued
Dependent Variable: Focused Acquisition Amount/Assets
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
After -0.019 -0.013 -0.034 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 -0.015 -0.018
(-0.69) (-0.55) (-1.22) (-0.67) (-0.69) (-0.68) (-0.78) (-0.67)
R&D 0.179 -0.109 0.230 0.198 0.190 0.231 0.189
(0.29) (-0.18) (0.39) (0.34) (0.31) (0.52) (0.32)
Sales/Assets 1.233** 0.464 1.224** 1.240** 1.247** 1.026*** 1.251**
(2.41) (1.34) (2.43) (2.44) (2.45) (2.97) (2.48)
Capex/Assets -1.171 -1.006 -1.122 -1.169 -1.187 -0.913 -1.157
(-1.10) (-1.03) (-1.04) (-1.10) (-1.12) (-1.17) (-1.10)
ROA -0.139 0.023 -0.472 -0.113 0.153 0.019 -0.101
(-0.11) (0.03) (-0.38) (-0.09) (0.20) (0.03) (-0.08)
ROE 0.142 0.093 0.247 0.168 0.100 0.123 0.130
(0.30) (0.38) (0.52) (0.36) (0.34) (0.46) (0.28)
B/M -0.105 -0.122 -0.167 -0.099 -0.103 -0.105 -0.116
(-0.93) (-1.31) (-1.52) (-0.90) (-0.93) (-0.94) (-1.10)
Cash/Assets 0.126 0.205 0.231 0.112 0.122 0.117 0.292
(0.32) (0.64) (0.59) (0.29) (0.31) (0.30) (1.08)
N 236 339 236 242 236 236 323 238
AdjR2 0.063 0.028 0.033 0.057 0.063 0.063 0.047 0.063
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 1.8:
Does Having Alternative Patent Increase Likelihood of Being Acquired?
This table presents key coefficient estimates that illustrate whether target’s having an alternative patent to
the alleged infringed patent increases likelihood of being acquired by the alleged infringer. The specification
for this table is a conditional logit model and is demonstrated in equation (1.4). Panel A and Panel B shows
the results for alleged infringers who lost and prevailed in the lawsuit, respectively. The dependent variable
is equal to one for the acquirer-actual target firm pair, and zero for three acquirer-control target pairs. The
control targets are selected by propensity score matching to the actual target by industry, size and B/M.
The regression includes deal fixed effects. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix A.3.2.
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Panel A: For Losers (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Alternative 4.092*** 2.167** 3.169** 2.529**
(2.92) (2.26) (2.14) (2.35)
Target Patents 0.313**
(2.12)
Knowledge Overlap 0.301*
(1.65)
Acquirer Base Overlap 14.561*
(1.69)
Target Base Overlap 11.378*
(1.85)
No. of Observations 124 124 124 124
No. of Actual Deals 31 31 31 31
No. of Control Deals 93 93 93 93
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.13
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Table 1.9:
Does Having Alternative Patent Increase Likelihood of Being Acquired?
This table presents key coefficient estimates that illustrate whether target’s having an alternative patent to
the alleged infringed patent increases likelihood of being acquired by the alleged infringer. The specification
for this table is a conditional logit model and is demonstrated in equation (1.4). Panel A and Panel B shows
the results for alleged infringers who lost and prevailed in the lawsuit, respectively. The dependent variable
is equal to one for the acquirer-actual target firm pair, and zero for three acquirer-control target pairs. The
control targets are selected by propensity score matching to the actual target by industry, size and B/M.
The regression includes deal fixed effects. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Section A.3.2.
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Panel B: For Winners (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Alternative 2.56 -4.445 -4.949 -5.177
(0.06) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Target Patents 0.343***
(3.11)
Knowledge Overlap 0.995***
(3.43)
Acquirer Base Overlap 13.742*
(2.35)
Target Base Overlap 1.237
(0.29)
Acq, Target Controls NO YES YES YES
Deal Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
No. of Observations 140 140 140 140
No. of Actual Deals 35 35 35 35
No. of Control Deals 105 105 105 105
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.14
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Table 1.10:
Do Focused Acquisitions For Losers Get Abnormal Returns?
This table presents results illustrating the relationship between the acquirer abnormal return and type
of the acquirer (i.e, loser or winner) and type of the acquisition (i.e, focused or diversifying). The exact
specification is defined in Eqn. (1.5). In this specification, dependent variable is cumulative abnormal
announcement returns (CAR[-1,1]) of all alleged infringers’ M&A transactions in 3 years after the court
announcement date. CAR[-1,1] is computed between day t = -1 to day t = +1 where t = 0 is the acquisition
announcement date. Abnormal returns are calculated in three different approaches: value-weighted,
equal-weighted and market model. In value-weighted (equal-weighted) approach, the abnormal returns
results after subtracting the return of the CRSP value-weighted (equal-weighted) market index over event
window. In market model, the abnormal return is calculated by subtracting return from market-based
estimate. The parameters for the market model are estimated over the (-205, -6) interval. I define
acquisitions in which acquirer and target are in the same 2-digit SIC code as focused acquisitions and others
as diversifying acquisitions. Loser group consist of all alleged infringers who was found infringing at least
one patent in CAFC during 1983-2011 period. Winner group consist of all alleged infringers who prevailed
in CAFC during the same period. Focused × Loser is the interaction term calculated by multiplication
of loser dummy and focused dummy. Dependant variable, The second columns of each approach presents
estimates with additional dependent variables: transaction value (in $mil), target public status dummy,
all cash dummy, acquirer market capitalization and relative size (transaction value divided by the equity
market capitalization of the acquirer at the end of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement).
Significance is based on White-adjusted standard errors with t-statistics are reported below each coefficient
in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable: CAR[-1,1]
Value-W Equal-W Market
(I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II)
Focused× Loser 0.17*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.24** 0.15*** 0.25**
(2.75) (2.69) (2.69) (2.45) (2.73) (2.59)
Loser -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 -0.006
(-0.45) (-0.99) (-0.90) (-1.14) (-0.11) (-0.80)
Focused -0.007* -0.010 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009
(-1.72) (-1.55) (-1.30) (-1.12) (-1.18) (-0.92)
N 386 172 386 172 386 172
Other Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj. R2 0.021 0.084 0.017 0.060 0.025 0.072
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Table 1.11:
Some Recent Jury Damage Awards in District Courts
Date Plaintiff Defendant Verdict($) District State
June-09 Centocor Inc. Abbott Laboratories 1,672,594,000 E.D. Tex.
March-07 Alcatel-Lucent Microsoft 1,500,000,000 S.D. Cal.
Dec-12 Carnegie Mellon University Marvell Technology 1,169,140,271 W.D PA
October-12 Apple, Inc. Samsung 1,049,343,540 N.D. Cal.
August-12 Monsanto Company Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l. 1,000,000,000 E.D. Mo.
October-10 Mirror Worlds LLC Apple Inc 625,500,000 E.D. Tex.
January-11 Saffran M.D. Johnson &Johnson 482,000,000 E.D. Tex.
February-08 Saffran Boston Sci. 431,867,351 E.D. Tex.
April-09 Uniloc USA Inc. Microsoft Corp. et al 388,000,000 R.I.
November-12 VirnetX Inc.Aˆ Cisco Systems, Inc. 368,160,000 E.D. Tex.
April-08 Alcatel-Lucent Microsoft 368,043,056 S.D. Cal.
May-11 Versata Software Inc. SAP America Inc. 345,000,000 E.D. Tex.
April-06 Hynix Rambus 306,900,000 N.D. Cal.
May-08 Medtronic Boston Scientific 250,000,000 E.D. Tex.
September-07 De Puy Medtronic Sofamor 226,300,000 Mass.
May-09 i4i LP Microsoft Corp 200,000,000 E.D. Tex.
December-07 C.R. Bard Gore Assocs 185,000,000 Ariz.
May-08 Cornell Hewlett-Packard Co 184,044,048 N.D. N.Y.
September-07 TGIP AT&T 156,000,000 E.D. Tex.
July-12 Mformation Tech. Research In Motion 147,200,000 N.D. Cal.
August-09 Versata Software Inc. SAP America 138,641,000 E.D. Tex.
April-06 z4 Microsoft 133,000,000 E.D. Tex.
May-05 Freedom Wireless Boston Commun. 128,025,000 Mass.
August-11 Active Video Networks Verizon Commc’n Inc. 115,000,000 E.D. Va.
August-12 WesternGeco, LLC ION Geophysical Corp. 105,900,000 S.D. Tex.
March-10 VirnetX, Inc. Microsoft Corp. 105,750,000 E.D. Tex.
September-11 Medtronic Sofamor NuVasive Inc. 101,196,000 S.D. Cal.
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Table 1.12:
Court Outcomes
This table presents the majority decision of dispositive patent infringement cases, in which one judge filed
a dissenting opinion. The data covers all adjudicated cases in CAFC from 1/1/1983 to 31/12/2011. Similar
to Janicke (2006), I define a case dispositive if it satisfies the following conditions: i) as it leaves the Federal
Circuit, at least one claim of one patent is finally adjudicated to have been infringed and not invalid or
unenforceable (i.e., a win for the patent owner); ii) it has been finally determined that no claim has these
characteristics (a win for the accused infringer). I include all dispositive decisions of the Federal Circuit,
whether by precedential opinion, nonprecedential opinion, or per curiam affirmance without opinion under
the courts Rule 36.
Result of the Case Frequency Percentage
Affirmed 105 51.98
Modified(In Part), Affirmed(In Part) 2 0.99
Reversed 18 8.91
Reversed (In Part), Affirmed(In Part) 52 25.74
Reversed (In Part), Vacated (In Part) 4 1.98
Vacated(In Part), Affirmed(In Part) 21 10.39
Total 202 100.00
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Table 1.13:
Some Of The Recent Large Scale Patent Acquisitions
Date Seller Buyer No. of patents Price Price /Patent
Dec-12 Kodak Consortium 1100 $525 mil $470K
Nov-12 Rockstar Apple 695 $2.5 bil. $3.59 mil.
Jul-12 Fujifilm Universal Display 1200 $105 mil. $ 87K
Jun-12 Interdigital Intel 1700 $375 mil. $220K
May-12 Motorola Mobility Google 17,000+ $5.5 B $323 K
Apr-12 AOL Microsoft 925 $1.05 bil. $1.13 mil.
Apr-12 Microsoft Facebook 650 $550 mil. $840K
Mar-12 IBM Facebook 750 -
Feb-12 MOSAID Google 200 -
Jan-12 Real Networks Intel 190 (+170 apps) $120M $632K
Jan-12 IBM Google 188 (+ 29 apps) -
Jan-12 Adaptix Acacia 230 $100 mil. $43K
Oct-11 MOSAID Sterling Partners 5385 $596 M $110 K
Sep-11 MOSAID Google 18 $11 M $610 K
Sep-11 Core Wireless, S.a.r.l. MOSAID 2000 (incl. apps) N/AAˆ
Aug-11 Glenayre Elect. Wi-LAN 60 $8 M $133 K
Aug-11 Google HTC 9 -Aˆ
Aug-11 IBM Google 1023 -Aˆ
Jul-11 IBM Google 1030 -
Jul-11 S3 HTC 235 $300 M $1.3 M
Jul-11 Nortel Rockstar Bidco Syn. 6000* $4.5 B $750 K
May-11 Hynix Mosaid 500 -
May-11 IBM Google 1000 -Aˆ
Apr-11 ADC Telecomm. HTC 82 $75M 915 K
Mar-11 Kodak Omnivision 850 $65M 76 K
Nov-10 Novell CPTN Holdings Syn. 882 $450 M $510 K
Aug-10 Friendster (MOL Global) Facebook 7 (+ 11 apps) $40M $5.7M
Apr-10 Palm HP 1500+ $1.2B $800 K
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Table 1.14:
Composition of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (as of Sep-2013)
The Federal Circuit may have a total of 12 active circuit judges sitting at any given time, who are required to
reside within 50 miles of the District of Columbia, as set by 28 U.S.C. § 44. Judges on senior status are not
subject to this restriction. As with other federal judges, they are nominated by the President and must be
confirmed by the Senate. Their terms last during the “good behavior” of the judges, which typically results
in life tenure. When eligible, judges may elect to take senior status. This allows a senior judge to continue
to serve on the court while handling fewer cases than an active service judge. Each judge in active service
employs a judicial assistant and up to four law clerks, while each judge in senior status employs a judicial
assistant and one law clerk.
No Title Judge Born Active Chief Senior
24 Chief Judge Randall Ray Rader 1949 1990-present 2010-present -
16 Circuit Judge Pauline Newman 1927 1984-present - -
22 Circuit Judge Alan David Lourie 1935 1990-present - -
29 Circuit Judge Timothy B. Dyk 1937 2000-present - -
30 Circuit Judge Sharon Prost 1951 2001-present - -
31 Circuit Judge Kimberly Ann Moore 1968 2006-present - -
32 Circuit Judge Kathleen M. O’Malley 1956 2010-present - -
33 Circuit Judge Jimmie V. Reyna 1952 2011-present - -
34 Circuit Judge Evan Wallach 1949 2011-present - -
35 Circuit Judge Richard G. Taranto 1957 2013-present - -
36 Circuit Judge Raymond T. Chen 1968 2013-present - -
37 Circuit Judge Todd M. Hughes 1966 2013-present - -
19 Senior Circuit Judge Haldane Robert Mayer 1941 1987-2010 1997-2004 2010
21 Senior Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager 1931 1989-2000 - 2000
23 Senior Circuit Judge Raymond Charles Clevenger III 1937 1990-2006 - 2006
25 Senior Circuit Judge Alvin Anthony Schall 1944 1992-2009 - 2009
26 Senior Circuit Judge William Curtis Bryson 1945 1994-2013 - 2013
28 Senior Circuit Judge Richard Linn 1944 1999-2012 - 2012
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Table 1.15:
List of Former Judges in Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (as of Sep-2013)
The Federal Circuit may have a total of 12 active circuit judges sitting at any given time, who are required to
reside within 50 miles of the District of Columbia, as set by 28 U.S.C. § 44. Judges on senior status are not
subject to this restriction. As with other federal judges, they are nominated by the President and must be
confirmed by the Senate. Their terms last during the “good behavior” of the judges, which typically results
in life tenure. When eligible, judges may elect to take senior status. This allows a senior judge to continue
to serve on the court while handling fewer cases than an active service judge. Each judge in active service
employs a judicial assistant and up to four law clerks, while each judge in senior status employs a judicial
assistant and one law clerk.
No Judge Born/Died Active service Chief Judge Senior status Termination
1 Don Nelson Laramore 1906-1989 - - 1982-1989 death
2 Giles Sutherland Rich 1904-1999 1982-1999 - - death
3 James Lindsay Almond, Jr. 1898-1986 - - 1982-1986 death
4 Oscar Hirsh Davis 1914-1988 1982-1988 - - death
5 Arnold Wilson Cowen 1905-2007 - - 1982-2007 death
6 Philip Nichols, Jr. 1907-1990 1982-1983 - 1983-1990 death
7 Byron George Skelton 1905-2004 - - 1982-2004 death
8 Phillip Benjamin Baldwin 1924-2002 1982-1986 - 1986-1991 retirement
9 Howard Thomas Markey 1920-2006 1982-1991 1982-1990 - retirement
10 Marion Tinsley Bennett 1914-2000 1982-1986 - 1986-2000 death
11 Shiro Kashiwa 1912-1998 1982-1986 - - retirement
12 Jack Richard Miller 1916-1994 1982-1985 - 1985-1994 death
13 Daniel Mortimer Friedman 1916-2011 1982-1989 - 1989-2011 death
14 Edward Samuel Smith 1919-2001 1982-1989 - 1989-2001 death
15 Helen Wilson Nies 1925-1996 1982-1995 1990-1994 1995-1996 death
17 Jean Galloway Bissell 1936-1990 1984-1990 - - death
18 Glenn Leroy Archer, Jr. 1929-2011 1985-1997 1994-1997 1997-2011 death
20 Paul Redmond Michel 1941- 1988-2010 2004-2010 - retirement
27 Arthur J. Gajarsa 1941- 1997-2011 - 2011-2012 retirement
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Table 1.16:
Dissent Rates of Judges in CAFC
This table represents the number of panel attendance, dissenting opinion and percentage of dissents for each
of CAFC judges from 1983 to 2011. The search was conducted with the following keywords: “DIS(Judge
Name) & PA(Judge Name) & TO(Patent)”.
No Judge Number of Panel Attendance Number of Dissent % of Dissent
1 Don Nelson Laramore 0 0 -
2 Giles Sutherland Rich 349 11 0.03
3 James Lindsay Almond, Jr. 0 0 -
4 Oscar Hirsh Davis 150 16 0.11
5 Arnold Wilson Cowen 91 3 0.03
6 Philip Nichols, Jr. 82 5 0.06
7 Byron George Skelton 110 1 0.01
8 Phillip Benjamin Baldwin 159 5 0.03
9 Howard Thomas Markey 271 4 0.01
10 Marion Tinsley Bennett 109 5 0.05
11 Shiro Kashiwa 66 4 0.06
12 Jack Richard Miller 113 10 0.09
13 Daniel Mortimer Friedman 345 7 0.02
14 Edward Samuel Smith 197 12 0.06
15 Helen Wilson Nies 254 18 0.07
16 Pauline Newman 977 155 0.16
17 Jean Galloway Bissell 113 3 0.03
18 Glenn Leroy Archer, Jr. 385 9 0.02
19 Haldane Robert Mayer 672 68 0.10
20 Paul Redmond Michel 703 22 0.03
21 S. Jay Plager 377 14 0.04
22 Alan David Lourie 909 41 0.05
23 Raymond Charles Clevenger III 547 24 0.04
24 Randall Ray Rader 948 36 0.04
25 Alvin Anthony Schall 626 19 0.03
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Table 1.16: Continued
No Judge Number of Panel Attendance Number of Dissent % of Dissent
26 William Curtis Bryson 765 30 0.04
27 Arthur J. Gajarsa 582 27 0.05
28 Richard Linn 559 22 0.04
29 Timothy B. Dyk 633 59 0.09
30 Sharon Prost 586 29 0.05
31 Kimberly Ann Moore 301 17 0.06
32 Kathleen M. O’Malley 108 11 0.10
33 Jimmie V. Reyna 103 13 0.13
34 Evan Wallach 60 4 0.07
35 Richard G. Taranto 10 1 0.10
36 Raymond T. Chen 0 0 -
37 Todd M. Hughes 0 0 -
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Table 1.17:
Number of Patent Lawsuit Filed In Each District Court
Source: Lex Machina Database
Court 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Central District of California 240 258 320 187 267 216 308 499
Central District of Illinois 4 6 10 6 5 3 2 5
District of Alaska 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
District of Arizona 26 25 21 23 23 17 28 35
District of Colorado 32 45 32 33 35 37 47 65
District of Columbia 6 12 22 19 13 14 14 11
District of Connecticut 28 40 23 28 17 33 24 23
District of Delaware 113 132 157 166 228 253 484 1002
District of Guam 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
District of Hawaii 8 3 2 2 1 1 10 11
District of Idaho 1 2 6 3 3 5 2 8
District of Kansas 11 11 9 13 11 5 12 7
District of Maine 2 2 4 7 3 0 1 8
District of Maryland 28 20 24 24 29 19 31 42
District of Massachusetts 72 69 55 49 59 69 86 80
District of Minnesota 75 63 51 46 46 63 78 64
District of Montana 2 1 0 1 0 0 2 2
District of Nebraska 8 9 7 9 7 8 10 14
District of Nevada 28 35 20 21 15 28 30 32
District of New Hampshire 7 7 8 7 3 3 6 8
District of New Jersey 102 140 196 159 143 153 177 159
District of New Mexico 3 2 2 1 4 8 2 2
District of North Dakota 5 3 3 2 0 1 0 2
District of Oregon 35 35 22 20 22 15 29 29
District of Puerto Rico 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 7
District of Rhode Island 2 6 2 5 2 4 1 3
District of South Carolina 18 13 14 10 4 13 11 12
District of South Dakota 1 3 1 3 0 1 2 0
District of Utah 40 44 41 36 29 52 52 66
District of Vermont 2 2 1 3 2 2 11 8
District of Virgin Islands 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
District of Wyoming 2 1 3 2 1 5 1 0
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Table 1.17: Continued
Court 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Eastern District of Arkansas 3 4 4 2 6 2 4 6
Eastern District of California 9 11 6 6 12 8 24 18
Eastern District of Kentucky 7 2 7 5 2 1 2 4
Eastern District of Louisiana 13 6 8 4 4 7 7 3
Eastern District of Michigan 49 54 53 60 47 57 62 43
Eastern District of Missouri 21 37 34 32 30 18 17 27
Eastern District of New York 50 36 28 30 34 15 33 30
Eastern District of North Carolina 5 6 10 22 8 12 7 19
Eastern District of Oklahoma 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 44 41 46 36 32 37 30 53
Eastern District of Tennessee 5 4 6 4 8 11 5 10
Eastern District of Texas 150 262 358 289 235 283 414 1248
Eastern District of Virginia 42 28 41 61 51 62 72 87
Eastern District of Washington 1 2 3 3 1 3 5 0
Eastern District of Wisconsin 26 43 23 24 26 18 31 27
Middle District of Alabama 0 1 1 0 1 1 3 1
Middle District of Florida 49 52 62 44 43 63 78 77
Middle District of Georgia 1 4 2 5 2 5 2 2
Middle District of Louisiana 4 0 2 3 0 0 4 2
Middle District of North Carolina 18 19 14 10 15 12 17 15
Middle District of Pennsylvania 4 10 3 6 6 4 3 9
Middle District of Tennessee 5 11 6 7 3 4 9 7
Northern District of Alabama 8 4 4 5 5 5 6 6
Northern District of California 178 141 134 162 163 175 217 260
Northern District of Florida 3 3 2 0 2 5 9 13
Northern District of Georgia 57 72 56 58 39 48 48 66
Northern District of Illinois 136 124 140 144 132 172 215 236
Northern District of Indiana 6 16 9 10 17 11 4 6
Northern District of Iowa 6 3 0 3 1 6 1 3
Northern District of Mississippi 0 1 3 1 2 1 0 0
Northern District of New York 13 9 11 8 10 10 5 12
Northern District of Ohio 34 43 37 48 41 32 43 45
Northern District of Oklahoma 3 7 6 6 8 8 8 7
Northern District of Texas 54 41 42 41 36 39 46 57
Northern District of West Virginia 2 2 3 4 11 6 6 5
Southern District of Alabama 3 1 0 0 0 1 2 1
Southern District of California 60 51 59 67 71 55 79 141
Southern District of Florida 65 62 65 32 43 64 63 133
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Table 1.17: Continued
Court 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Southern District of Georgia 3 2 2 1 2 0 0 1
Southern District of Illinois 5 2 6 6 1 1 3 2
Southern District of Indiana 16 22 16 27 23 44 26 23
Southern District of Iowa 11 7 11 9 13 8 7 2
Southern District of Mississippi 2 1 3 0 1 2 5 4
Southern District of New York 130 107 102 105 111 104 150 141
Southern District of Ohio 23 28 20 22 30 16 23 27
Southern District of Texas 51 27 28 30 37 34 33 46
Southern District of West Virginia 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
Western District of Arkansas 5 2 1 3 10 4 1 1
Western District of Kentucky 1 6 6 4 3 7 4 8
Western District of Louisiana 8 5 4 6 4 3 1 4
Western District of Michigan 19 8 10 16 7 13 15 12
Western District of Missouri 13 14 13 9 5 9 9 14
Western District of New York 16 18 22 20 9 17 7 15
Western District of North Carolina 22 19 18 16 8 13 24 20
Western District of Oklahoma 5 7 5 5 6 3 7 14
Western District of Pennsylvania 18 17 18 14 16 16 11 39
Western District of Tennessee 11 8 7 7 1 4 2 31
Western District of Texas 38 17 15 13 22 34 41 55
Western District of Virginia 7 5 1 3 8 5 12 3
Western District of Washington 40 30 44 42 38 51 61 43
Western District of Wisconsin 20 26 49 40 25 38 44 31
Totals 2499 2581 2747 2527 2502 2715 3532 5423
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1.1:
US Court of Appeals & District Courts Map
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United-States-courts-of-appeals
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Figure 1.2:
Number of Patent Lawsuits
This figure shows the number of patent lawsuits filed in U.S District Courts. (Source: LexMachina Database)
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Figure 1.3:
Number of Dissent in CAFC Panels
This figure shows the number of dissenting dispositive court opinions by year. The sample is created as
follows: first, I search all U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Opinions from 1/1/1983 to 31/12/2011
with the keywords “dissent! and patent”. This search returns 757 court opinions; 662 of these opinions are
related with patent law and the rest is about other type of laws including civil procedure, trademark law,
copyright law etc. 199 out of 658 cases are appeals raised from United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) or International Trade Commission (ITC). Since my interest in this paper is only the appeals
raised from U.S District Courts, I eliminate appeals from these governmental offices. This filtering leaves me
with 459 court opinions. To include into my sample, I read each opinion whether it is a “dispositive” one,
which means that as it leaves the Federal Circuit, at least one claim of one patent is finally adjudicated to
have been infringed and not invalid or unenforceable (i.e., a win for the patent owner), or in which it has
been finally determined that no claim has these characteristics (a win for the accused infringer). I include
all dispositive decisions of the Federal Circuit, whether by precedential opinion, nonprecedential opinion, or
per curiam affirmance without opinion under the court’s Rule 36. Then, I check the history of each case
to make sure that this case was not appealed to the Supreme Court or reheard in an enbanc decision in a
later stage. After excluding non-dissenting decisions and using these filters, I get 202 dispositive opinions,
in which one of the judges have a dissenting opinion.
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Figure 1.4:
Patent Caseload in CAFC
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Note:  Includes reinstated, cross- and consolidated appeals.
Filings of Patent Infringement Appeals 
from the U.S. District Courts
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Figure 1.5:
All Caseload in CAFC
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Notes:  Includes reinstated, cross- and consolidated appeals. FY13 data is derived from the CMECF database. Prior years were derived from the court's 
legacy database.
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Figure 1.6:
Caseload in CAFC by Origin
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Notes:  Includes reinstated, cross-, and consolidated appeals. FY13 data is derived from the CMECF database. Prior years were derived from the court's 
legacy database.
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Figure 1.7:
Median Disposition in CAFC
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
Median Disposition Time
for Cases Decided by Merits Panels
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Figure 1.8:
Median Disposition in CAFC by Origin
FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 FY 12 FY 13
Overall 
Median 
per Origin
District Court 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.6 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.2 11.8 11.8 11.3
Court of Federal Claims 11.0 11.2 10.0 10.0 9.2 10.3 10.0 10.6 9.9 10.4 10.3
Court of International Trade 12.0 11.5 11.7 11.9 12.4 11.5 11.0 12.2 12.6 12.4 11.8
Court of Appeals Veterans Claims 10.0 9.9 8.4 8.4 8.0 9.3 9.3 6.0 8.6 11.2 9.1
Board of Contract Appeals 9.7 10.5 11.7 10.4 9.6 11.9 8.8 10.0 11.5 13.3 10.8
Department of Veterans Affairs n/a 14.4 13.7 11.3 4.8 18.9 n/a 19.4 15.7 n/a 14.4
Department of Justice n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 8.9 8.9 n/a n/a 9.7 9.7
International Trade Commission 16.0 16.4 15.6 13.6 14.4 14.4 14.8 14.6 16.1 13.7 14.4
Merit Systems Protection Board 6.9 7.5 6.5 6.4 5.8 6.5 6.1 6.1 6.4 7.4 6.5
Office of Compliance 10.1 13.3 14.0 n/a 19.0 n/a 13.0 15.0 n/a n/a 13.6
Patent and Trademark Office 9.6 10.3 10.0 9.6 8.9 9.3 8.2 11.2 11.7 10.1 10.0
Overall Median per Fiscal Year 10.0 9.9 9.3 9.1 9.0 9.3 9.1 9.7 9.9 10.6
1   Excludes cross and consolidated appeals, writs, and OPM petitions
2   Calculated from Date of Docketing or Date of Reinstatement, whichever is later
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Median Time to Disposition in Cases Terminated After Hearing or Submission1
Docketing Date2 to Disposition Date, in Months
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Figure 1.9: Apple’s Motion for Infringement1
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The entire sequence is depicted below in a side by side comparison, showing the first, 
second, third, and fourth portions of the photograph in Figures 1 to 4.  Neither the second nor the 
fourth portion is the same as the first portion. 
Use of the Samsung devices also infringes dependent claims 2-5, 7, 9-10, 13, 14, and 16 
of the ’381 patent.  (Balakrishnan Decl. ¶¶ 54-87.)  These dependent claims add various 
limitations, such as specifying that the “object” on the touch screen device is a finger (claim 2); 
the “second direction” is opposite the “first direction” (claim 10); the area beyond the edge is 
displayed as black or a solid color (claim 13); and the change in direction makes the edge of the 
electronic document appear to be “elastically attached” to the edge of the touch screen (claim 16).   
Claim 19 claims a device with a touch screen display, processor, and memory, with 
program instructions to perform the steps of claim 1.  Each of the accused Samsung devices 
Ý¿­»ëæïïó½ªóðïèìêóÔØÕ   Ü±½«³»²¬èê    Ú·´»¼ðéñðïñïï   Ð¿¹»îé ±º íé
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Chapter 2
Do Uncertainties in Bankruptcy Law
Affect Optimal Loan Contracts? A
Quasi Natural Experiment
It is difficult to make a law that can encompass all potential scenarios that may thereafter
arise and has its stated and perceived goals. The situation may be especially more severe for
the bankruptcy law, which needs to be quickly adjusted to dynamically changing structures
of corporations. If law makers are not swift to take the necessary steps, then contours
of the bankruptcy law are shaped in court rooms as well as in the Congress. Resulting
subjective decisions in bankruptcies may lead to uncertainty for the creditors and may yield
a chaos in the financial system. Hence, it is important to explore whether and how much
the uncertainties in the U.S bankruptcy law affect the U.S syndicated loan market.
In this paper, I investigate probably the most important and unpredictable Chapter 11
doctrine, substantive consolidation (subcon). Even though subcon has been the subject
of extensive media coverage and has been debated among law scholars about its theoretical
origins and legal interpretation of controversies between the lower and upper court decisions1,
1Widen (2006), Sprayregen and Friedland (2005), Brasher (2006) and Baird (2005).
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it is surprising that finance literature has not paid any attention. Hence, in this paper I fill
this void by investigating its effects on the U.S syndicated loan market.
In subcon technique, company assets are pooled and existing subsidiary guarantees (i.e,
structural seniorities) are eliminated. With guarantees removed, claims are distributed pari
passu (on an equal footing) among all unsecured claims. Hence, senior unsecured creditors
such as banks, which generally require subsidiary guarantees in order to make loans2, may
be exposed to huge recovery shocks. To illustrate, let’s exemplify a simplified version of
Owens Corning bankruptcy case, which will be explained in detail in Section 2.1.2. Owens
Corning has $4 billion unsecured bonds and $2 billion senior unsecured bank loans. As
typical in syndicate loans, banks are provided subsidiary guarantees for payment default.
When Owens Cornings files bankruptcy, it has $1 billion of assets in parent level and $2
billion in its subsidiaries. Since banks have subsidiary guarantees and subsidiaries have
sufficient assets to pay back the loans, banks should get $2 billion. However, if the judge
approves subcon technique, then assets are pooled, guarantees are removed and banks get
only $1 billion. Hence, just in a single case, a judge’s decision can dilute the banks’ claim in
the amount of $1billion.
Even though in practice creditors are exposed to unanticipated huge recovery shocks, still
there does not exist any specific U.S Code provision that would provide the judges a coherent
theoretical framework to base their decisions3. As this procedure may unfairly disregard the
existing contracts, official court opinions refers substantive consolidation as an “extreme and
2S&P (2011) pg. 26
3In court opinions, subcon is derived from Bankruptcy Court’s general equitable powers as set forth in
both §105 of the Bankruptcy code, which authorizes the court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions” and also from section 1123(a)(5)(C).
66
unusual remedy” (In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 2002)) and suggest for it to be
used “rarely”4. Despite such official statements, approximately half of the public or large
private bankruptcies are executed in the shadow of substantive consolidation. Moreover, the
uncertainty survives today as seen in the recent Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy.5
Given the uncertainty regarding subcon, I explore how the threat to creditors effects
the lending behavior of banks in the U.S syndicated loan market. Primarily, I focus on
the collateral and covenants requirements, which are a contract’s essential parts that can
severely affect the future operations and restructuring of a company. For example, a secured
loan, in which the borrower pledges company assets as collateral, decreases the lender’s
incentive to renegotiate the loans when the borrower is in financial distress. Moreover, after
borrowing secured loans, there may not be sufficient collateral to pledge for the future ones.
Hence, company may have difficulty in raising additional backing because the new debt
is subordinated to existing secured loans. In addition to collateral requirement, financial
covenants have also real effects on corporate policies. As documented in Chava and Roberts
(2008) and Nini and Sufi (2009), covenant violations play an important role in corporate
governance and capital structure.6
4Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847 (“The power to consolidate should be used sparingly because of the possibility of
unfair treatment of creditors of a corporate debtor who have dealt solely with that debtor without knowledge
of its interrelationship with others.”) Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Ass’n, Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 248 (11th Cir.
1991) (noting substantive consolidation should be used “sparingly”); Brief for Respondent at 9, McMonagle v.
Credit Suisse First Boston, 126 S. Ct. 1910 (2006) (Nos. 05-827, 05-941) (“because substantive consolidation
is extreme and imprecise, this “rough justice” remedy should be rare and one of last resort after considering
and rejecting more precise remedies conferred by the Bankruptcy Code”)
5 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bc9ff0e2-1f47-11e0-8c1c-00144feab49a.html#
axzz2CRemsgiv
6 Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini and Sufi (2009) show that after violations, companies sharply
decrease capital expenditures. Moreover, Nini and Sufi (2012) find evidences that after violation, creditors
play an active role in corporate governance of the company. Nini and Sufi (2012) find that violations are
followed immediately by a decline in acquisitions and capital expenditures, a sharp reduction in leverage and
shareholder payout, and an increase in CEO turnover.
67
In the first hypothesis, I investigate whether after exposure to subcon, a lender transmits
this shock to its other clients by writing secured loans more frequently. The main rational
is that subcon affects senior creditors only if the loans are granted on an unsecured basis.
According to U.S. bankruptcy law, secured creditors are entitled to receive the entire amount
of their secured claim, the portion the claim that is backed by collateral, before any unsecured
claims are paid. Therefore, secured creditors are not affected by this bankruptcy technique.
To test the first hypothesis, I use borrower fixed effects to control for time-invariant bor-
rower characteristics and time fixed effects to control for macroeconomic factors. Moreover,
I also control for bank capitalization since depletion or increase of capital can affect bank’s
loan portfolio composition. Hence, ruling out borrower side risk, economy wide factors or
bank capital explanations, I test whether subcon is important for lender’s demand for col-
lateral. I find that one standard deviation change of lender’s subcon exposure ratio, number
of past subcon bankruptcies to total bankruptcies, increases the probability of the lender’s
new loan being a secured one approximately 9.2%. As a robustness test, I remove borrower
fixed effect since it requires the borrower to have at least 2 observations in the sample to be
included. However, the results are similar to fixed effect specification.
Although banks would like to grant every loan on secured basis ceteris paribus, it is not
possible to back each loan by a collateral since there might not exist sufficient collateralizable
assets. Moreover, the borrower may strictly prefer to get an unsecured loan since it may not
want to lose its option to get easy financing in the future. Therefore, in the second part of
the first hypothesis, I examine whether increase in subcon exposure prompt the lender to
demand higher interest rate in new unsecured loans controlling for the company risk. I find
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that one standard deviation change of lender’s subcon exposure ratio, number of past subcon
bankruptcies to total bankruptcies, increases the unsecured loan interest rate 11 basis points.
As a robustness test, I investigate whether subcon exposure cause banks to demand higher
interest for secured loans. Consistent with our expectations, there is not significant interest
change for the secured loans, strengthening the argument that interest rate change is caused
by subcon exposure.
In the second hypothesis, I investigate whether uncertainties regarding subcon cause
lenders to change the tightness of the covenants they write. Without exposure to subcon,
banks may tolerate the extra usage of junior credits, trusting the higher priority of their
claims if the debtor should go bankrupt. However, when judges decide to use subcon,
unsecured senior bank loans may receive the same recovery as junior debt. Hence, the shock
of such an experience may reduce banks’ tolerance to extra junior debt and this can have an
effect on financial covenants.
For the second hypothesis, controlling for borrower and time fixed effects, I expect an
increase in the covenant tightness of unsecured loans by an increase in exposure of the
lenders to subcon. However, I do not expect any change in the strictness of the covenants for
secured loans because they are not affected by subcon. My results show that for unsecured
loans, at the median contract strictness level, one standard deviation increase in subcon
exposure ratio, increases the probability of lender control in a year from 31.45% to 36.01%.
The effects, however, are more dramatic if we consider firms for which violations are less
common. A firm in the 10th percentile of contract strictness has close to zero probability
of violation in the first year. After the effect of a one standard deviation increase in subcon
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exposure, the probability of a violation increases to 6.1% in the first year and to 11.9% in
the second year. As covenant violations have been shown to reduce investment on the order
of magnitude of 1% of capital (Chava and Roberts (2008)) and reduce annual debt issuance
by 2.5% of assets (Roberts and Sufi (2009), the increased probability of a violation should
be considered material to the firm’s financing decisions. As a robustness test, I investigate
whether subcon exposure has any effect on the covenant tightness for the secured loans. In
line with our expectations, for a secured loan, subcon exposure does not have any effect
on covenant strictness. After having these results, next I explore the main channels in the
light of existing theories. Rational arguments would suggest that at the onset of heating
of judical debates, all lenders would react to subcon news, yielding a time series increase
in the collateral demand. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find evidence that there is
an increasing lenders’ collateral demand starting in 20037 , the year Worldcom bankruptcy
demonstrated the dark side of subcon to creditors. In this highly debated bankruptcy case,
some claims amounting to $750 million received only %44 recovery while they should have got
full recovery of 113% (representing principal and post-petition interest) without subcon. The
unexpected shock to these creditors appeared in media8 and was harshly criticized among law
scholars9. According to practitioners10, a lot of facts that were cited to support for subcon
7In 2003, another Mega bankruptcy that subcon was the main focus of the debate was the Kmart case.
Subcon diluted the unsecured bank loan recovery and increased the junior bond recovery. The issue was also
explicitly stated in Kmart’s SEC filings: “substantive consolidation would harm the banks in violation of
one of the key requirements that substantive consolidation be in the best interest of all creditors... because
if the Kmart entities were substantively consolidated, the Subsidiary Guarantees would be eliminated... and
[the bank’s] anticipated recovery on that single claim would be diluted by the claims of all other unsecured
creditors” January 24, 2003, 8-K reports.
8http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/02/business/mci-investors-learn-promises-can-be-broken.
html
9Baird (2005) states: “...the court might have been able to do more than simply throw up his hands.”
10http://metropolitancorporatecounsel.com/articles/4030/worldcom-mci-and-second-circuits-substantive-
consolidation-doctrine-asserting-creditor
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in WorldCom bankruptcy are present also in many corporations and has implications in the
subsequent cases.
Even though one should expect a time series shift in collateral demand in aggregate,
different reactions in the cross section of the lenders is not very obvious. If each lender is
observing these bankruptcies, then why are lenders behaving differently? The main reason
may stem from the complexity of a judicial process. When judges write their opinions in a
case, they evaluate and cite the decisions in the preceding cases to be consistent with the
underlying law. However, corporations are too complex to exactly match one single case
to another. For example, in WorldCom, in a single month more than 600,000 transactions
took place. Millions of transactions were flawed through interliability accounts, totaling
one trillion dollars11. Since a lender may be using similar contracts to each of its clients,
a recent exposure may prompt a lender to update its expectation for future exposure more
pessimistically compared to its peers. Additionally, the results may partly be attributed to
asymmetric information between the lenders. Even though, theoretically, bankruptcy docu-
ments are publicly available, the details of each case are not written into bankruptcy filings
and remain as unpublished. Therefore, a lender may learn better from its own exposure.
Alternatively, the results may be explained in a behavioral framework. A recent subcon
exposure may lead a loan officer to refrain from future exposure by changing the terms of
the contracts.
To make solid arguments for the validity of these results and explanations, it is essential
to alleviate the endogeneity concerns. Unobservable variables that are driving a bank to be
11(In re WorldCom 2003 WL 23861928, at* 11)
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exposed to shock might also be driving the bank to change the way it lends on the loan
market. One of the unique aspects of subcon that helps us to challenge the endogeneity
problem is the consensus in both legal scholars and practitioners on the unpredictability
of the usage of the doctrine. For example, Widen (2006) writes, “I hope to convince you
that [substantive consolidation] is the most important doctrine in corporate reorganization.
Each year the allocation of billions of dollars among competing creditor groups turns on
decisions by courts to approve or reject use of the doctrine... To date, however, no such
clear formulation exists; the current state of substantive consolidation doctrine is a mess,
leaving courts and reorganization participants adrift”. Sprayregen and Friedland (2005)
further notes, “Substantive consolidation jurisprudence, perhaps more than many other areas
of bankruptcy law, is highly unpredictable” and Brasher (2006) writes, “Despite several
attempts to craft a coherent doctrine at the appellate level, however, bankruptcy courts
continue to apply substantive consolidation without a coherent theoretical framework”.12
Even though there is consensus regarding the unpredictability of subcon, endogeneity
concerns may also be based on different grounds. One alternative explanation to my findings
may be that if companies are able to select their judges, who may have personal biases, then
my experiments may suffer from endogeneity problem. Indeed, focusing on some specific
Chapter 11 motions, Chang and Schoar (2013) find evidences that there are differences
among judges to grant or deny some motions. However, their findings do not cast doubt on
12Brasher (2006) also notes, “This lack of theoretical coherence makes courts hesitant to order substantive
consolidation under the best of facts and leads to irregularity when they do”. Finally, Baird (2005) states,
“Nevertheless, a statutory basis for the doctrine is hard to find, and the lower court practice is often at odds
with the doctrine as spelled out in appellate court opinions”. Pepper Hamilton Law Firm: “Substantive
Consolidation: The Uncertainty Continues” http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_article.aspx?
articlekey=691. Archer & Greiner Law Firm: “The effect upon debtors and creditors can be far-reaching
and unanticipated”. www.archerlaw.com/files/articles/CL%20PACKMAN%203.6.06.pdf
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my results for several reasons. As discussed in detail in Chang and Schoar (2013), judges are
randomly assigned to cases within the district13. Hence, even if some judges have personal
biases, the bankrupt firm do not know which judge will be in charge of the case. Another
alternative story to my findings may be about the choice of a court to file bankruptcy.
If some circuits apply this technique more often than other circuits, then companies may
be selecting specific forums. Considering the fact that judges are randomly assigned, the
relevant selection variable should be the ratio of subcon cases to total bankruptcy cases in
that circuit. Most cases are filed in Delaware and NY courts. My sample shows that 60% of
the Delaware Courts, 55% of the NY courts and 54% of the other court cases were subcon
cases. Hence, there does not seem to exist significant differences among the circuits about
the application frequency of subcon. These results are also consistent with the theoretical
arguments of Stratton (2007), who say that the most popular forums Deleware and NY courts
use “essentially identical” tests for subcon. To further mitigate the endogeneity concerns, I
investigate whether various bank characteristics such as bank capital ratios, capitalization
or Non-Performing loan ratios have statistical power to predict banks’ subcon exposure or
firms choosing a circuit to file bankruptcy. However, each of these variables are insignificant,
fostering the arguments in law literature that subcon is quite unpredictable. For all of the
above reasons, I believe that my experiments do not suffer from endogeneity problem.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. To my knowledge, this is the first
paper to show that uncertainties in U.S bankruptcy procedures provide an important friction
13Federal Judical Center: “Most district and bankruptcy courts use random assignment, which helps to
ensure a fair distribution of cases and also prevents “judge shopping,” or parties’ attempts to have their
cases heard by the judge who they believe will act most favorably”
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and affect syndicated loan markets. The results are interesting because US bankruptcy pro-
cedures are known to be highly efficient and inspirational to the rest of the world. Smith and
Stromberg (2005) explain that the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France and Sweden
have all instituted more debtor-friendly, U.S.-styled reorganization codes in their bankruptcy
laws. Hence, my results show that some important frictions remain even in probably the
most efficient bankruptcy system. Furthermore, my paper complements the previous liter-
ature on determinants of equilibrium contracts by providing a new channel. My findings
show that these frictions play a significant role in explaining a loan’s collateral requirement,
interest rate and covenant strictness. Considering that some firms do not have sufficient
assets to pledge as collateral because they have already been pledged in their existing debt,
many financially constrained firms may have difficulty in creating new liquidity. This is
particularly important for policy makers who want to ease bank lending standards during a
financial crisis.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide an overview
of substantive consolidation by presenting a bankruptcy case to explain how the subcon
technique can have a detrimental effect on bank loan recoveries. In Section 3, I describe the
data sources. In section 4, I discuss the results of the empirical analysis for each hypothesis.
Finally, Section 5 provides a summary and conclusion.
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2.1 Background on Substantive Consolidation
2.1.1 Substantive Consolidation
Substantive consolidation has been one of the most debated bankruptcy issues over the last
decade. It derives from the Bankruptcy Court’s general equitable powers as set forth in both
section 105 of the Bankruptcy code, which authorizes the court to “issue any order, process,
or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions” and also from
section 1123(a)(5)(C) of U.S.C. In this technique, the assets of the bankrupt company are
pooled, all interliability agreements eliminated and the third party liabilities satisfied from
the asset pool. With the removal of the interliability agreements, unsecured senior creditors,
who require subsidiary guarantees to grant the loan, receive a lower recovery than expected.
In contrast, unsecured junior creditors such as trade creditors or junior bond holders receive a
higher one. Unsecured syndicated bank loans, typically the highest seniority claims, usually
require interliability agreements to provide loans (S&P (2011)). Hence, a judge’s decision to
use subcon may have a detrimental effect on the recovery of unsecured bank loans.
In the next subsection, I will present a bankruptcy case, Owens Corning, as an example
to explain in detail how subcon can affect the recovery of unsecured bank loans. In the case,
a judge’s “yes” or “no” decision affected the recovery for banks at the order of $1billion. In
this bankruptcy, district court decision was reversed by a court of appeals decision. Hence,
this case is also a good example to demonstrate the controversies between the lower and
upper court decisions regarding subcon14.
14Baird (2005) says, “[about subcon] a statutory basis for the doctrine is hard to find, and the lower court
practice is often at odds with the doctrine as spelled out in appellate court opinions.”
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2.1.2 An Example Case: Owens Corning Bankruptcy
In 1997, Owens Corning had access to $2 billion in unsecured syndicate loans, of which
Credit Suisse First Boston was the lead arranger. As typical in other unsecured syndicate
bank loans, Owens Corning was required to provide subsidiary guarantees that gave the
banks structural seniority and direct claims against the guarantors for payment default.
This structural seniority was crucial because the banks viewed such guarantees as credit
enhancements, without which Owens Corning would not have been granted the loans. In
2000, huge asbestos liabilities caused Owens Corning and seventeen of its subsidiaries to file
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Delaware. As part of the reorganization plan, the debtors
proposed “deemed consolidation” to restructure the company. Deemed consolidation is the
same as substantive consolidation in terms of creditor distribution and voting rights. The
only difference is that in deemed consolidation the legal entities are not actually combined
for legal and tax purposes. Since our interest is distribution to creditors, I will use the terms
“deemed consolidation” and “substantive consolidation” interchangeably.
Figure 2.1 shows a simplified version of the situation in the Owens Corning bankruptcy
case as reported in Widen (2008). In this representation, Subsidiaries 1 and 2 stand for
the significant assets that provided the guarantees for the loans. Subsidiary 3 represents a
group of nonsignificant subsidiaries, valued at less than $30 million, which did not provide
guarantees. Although the bank loans were written at the parent level, the banks had claims
to both Subsidiaries 1 and 2 because they provided guarantees. Hence, the effective lender
claims in those subsidiaries were also $2 billion. The noteholders had claims only on the
parent company at a value of $4 billion. The last row shows the consolidated values for the
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company assets and creditor claims.
These subsidiary guarantees were important for the banks. First, they protected the bank
loans against structural subordination. By them, no other future creditor could be granted
structural priority over the bank loans. Second, they provided the banks with structural
priority over the noteholders, who had claims only on the parent company. Thus, without
substantive consolidation, the banks would have had access to the assets of Subsidiaries 1
and 2, and would have been paid in full before any money was given to the noteholders.
The total bank loans were $2 billion and Subsidiaries 1 and 2 were worth that, so without
substantive consolidation, the banks would have received $2 billion, or 100% recovery.
However, allocations can change dramatically if the judge approves the technique. The
effect of deemed consolidation was that it removed the subsidiary guarantees of the 1997
Credit Agreement, rendering the banks’ claims pari passu (on an equal footing) with the
unsecured claims of the noteholders. As seen in the last column of Figure 2.1, the consol-
idated assets of the company to be shared among the creditors were $3 billion, while the
noteholder claims were $4 billion and the bank loans $2 billion. In this scenario, the claims
were to be shared in amounts proportional to the respective creditors’ claims, i.e., $2 billion
to the noteholders and $1 billion to the banks, reducing the banks’ recovery to 50%. Hence,
the judge’s decision on substantive consolidation change the banks’ recovery by $1 billion.
In the first round of the case, the Delaware District Court granted the plan proponents’
motion for deemed substantive consolidation over the banks’ objections. In support of its
order, the bankruptcy court had concluded that15: (i) There was substantial identity between
15 In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168, 171-172 (Bank. D.Del. 2004).
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Owens Corning and its subsidiaries; (ii) the banks did not rely on the separate credit of the
subsidiaries; (iii) consolidation would simplify and expedite completion of the reorganization;
and (iv) it would be exceedingly difficult to untangle the financial affairs of the various
entities.
After the Delaware District Court opinion, the banks appealed to the upper court. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals set forth five principles for substantive consolidation to
be advanced: (i) limiting the cross-creep of liability by respecting entity separateness is a
fundamental ground rule; (ii) the harms substantive consolidation addresses are nearly always
those caused by debtors; (iii) mere benefit of administration of the case is hardly a harm
calling substantive consolidation into play; (iv) substantive consolidation should be a rare
remedy and one of last resort after considering and rejecting other remedies; and (v) while
substantive consolidation may be used defensively to remedy the identifiable harms caused
by entangled affairs, it may not be used offensively. Based on these principles, the court
held that, in the Third Circuit, what must be proven is that (a) pre-bankruptcy, the entities
to be consolidated “disregarded separateness so significantly that their creditors relied on
the breakdown of entity borders and treated them as one legal entity”; or (b) after filing
for bankruptcy, the entities’ assets and liabilities “are so scrambled that separating them is
prohibitive and hurts all creditors”. Applying this test to the facts in Owens Corning, the
court found that substantive consolidation was not appropriate in that case.16
16In re Owens Corning, 2005 WL 1939796 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2005), reversing 316 B.R. 168 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2004).
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2.2 Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, I first briefly describe my data sources. Then I provide summary statistics
regarding lenders, borrowers, syndicated loan facilities and substantive consolidation cases.
2.2.1 Data Sources
This study uses various data sources. Below I summarize the content of each data source,
explain the relevant filters and detail how I exploit them for my analysis. The data sources
that I use are: LPC DealScan, Compustat, S&P Capital IQ, Widen Substantive Consoli-
dation Database, Lopucki Bankruptcy Research Database (“BRD”), PACER (B-4 reports)
and SEC filings.
2.2.2 Loan Level Data
In a typical syndicate loan, lead arrangers initiate the loans and negotiate the contractual
terms with the company. Then lead arrangers sell some portion of the loans to other banks
or institutions, which are called participants. These are passive investors who leave the loan
monitoring to the lead arrangers. In syndications, companies typically borrow different types
of facilities such as credit lines or term loans as parts of a loan package. The covenants for
these loans are determined for the whole package, i.e., they are not defined at the facility
level.
In this paper, I use the Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan
database for the loan-level data. DealScan covers loan details from syndicated and bilateral
loans collected by staff reporters from lead arrangers and SEC filings. The database includes
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detailed information, at both the facility and package levels, about the amount, start and end
dates, covenants and lead arrangers. Since the lead arrangers are responsible for monitoring
the loan and they keep the highest fraction, all of my analysis is based on lead arrangers.
I classify a lender as a lead arrangers if its “LeadArrangerCredit” field indicates “Yes”. If
no lead arranger is identified using this approach, I accept the ones whose “LenderRole”
fall into the following fields: lead arranger, lead bank, lead manager, mandated arranger,
administrative agent, agent, arranger, bookrunner, coordinating arranger, or mandated lead
arranger.
I restrict my sample to dollar-based loans in the 2000-2006 period since my subcon data
covers only 2000-2005 bankruptcies. I drop financial companies (SIC 6000-6009) and also
eliminate companies with missing or negative assets or sales. After this filtering, I merge
my sample with accounting data available from Compustat, using a link file provided by
Michael Roberts (as used in Chava and Roberts (2008)). Table 2.1 Panel A shows the
summary statistics for the LPC Dealscan-Compustat sample. I have 14,178 packages with
a mean loan amount of $544 million. The average maturity for the loans is 45 months, and
approximately 70% of these loans are secured. The borrowing companies have a mean asset
value of $5.6 billion and leverage ratio of 33.5%. The mean values of EBITDA/Assets and
Current Ratio are 10.9% and 1.739, respectively. Around half of the sample have an S&P
long-term credit rating. I assign numerical values to these ratings from 1(AAA) to 26(D).
The median company in my sample has a credit score of 10, equivalent to that of BBB.
In my experiments, one of the dependent variables is the collateral requirement. LPC
Dealscan has a secured field that indicates whether the borrower has pledged any collateral
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to the lenders. However, for approximately half of the facilities, this field is empty. Since
this is my dependent variable and I am using logit regression with borrower fixed effects,
I need to have enough data and variation for a reasonable experiment. Therefore, I hand
collect this data from SEC filings and merge them with the existing data.
For the contract strictness part, I merge my sample with the LPC lender and covenant
databases. Through this step, I obtain information about borrower characteristics, the
lender’s name and loan covenants at the package level. Using the lender’s name, I gather
ultimate parent-level accounting data from Federal Reserve’s Y-9C database for U.S. banks
and from Capital IQ for non-U.S. banks. In my sample, I require loans to be led by lenders
who were exposed to at least one bankruptcy case with unsecured loans to the borrower.
The rationale is that lenders without bankruptcy experience could be very different than
those with it, in unobservable characteristics that could add bias to my results. However,
it is worth noting that the vast majority of lenders had at least one bankruptcy during
the sample period. Table2.1 Panel B shows the summary statistics for the merged sample.
After eliminating packages with missing loan amount and maturity, I get 2,148 packages.
In this sample, the average loan amount is $1.09 billion and the mean loan maturity is 42
months. The loan amounts seem to be larger than the original sample. One explanation
may be that LPC had lender information for bigger loans. In this new sample, borrowers
have a mean asset value of $6.5 billion, leverage ratio of 0.27%, EBITDA/Asset of 12.7% and
current ratio of 1.77. Hence, the borrower characteristics are similar to those of the LPC
Dealscan-Compustat sample.
In this new sample, I identify the lender information for 1,415 of the packages. The
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mean value of the total lender assets is $675 billion. The average lender capitalization is
7.02%. Concerning the lender performance measures, the mean values for Non-Performing
Loans/Total Loans and Non-Performing Loans/Total Assets are 1.32% and 0.55%, respec-
tively. The average values for Tier 1 Capital Ratio and Total Capital Ratio are 8.64% and
12.27%.
LPC Dealscan provide detailed information about the type and initial ratio or amount
of the covenants. For the strictness measure, I follow Murfin (forth.) and use the fol-
lowing covenants: minimum EBITDA/debt, current ratio, quick ratio, tangible net worth,
total net worth, EBITDA, fixed-charge coverage, interest coverage, maximum debt/equity,
debt/tangible net worth, capital expenditure and leverage ratio. These cover the vast ma-
jority of the Dealscan database. The average contract strictness in my sample is 16.63%
with a median strictness of 9.01%.
2.2.3 Bankruptcy Data
For substantive consolidation, I use the Subcon Database, which was provided through
the generosity of Prof. Widen of the University of Miami Law School. This database
investigate the 2000-2005 bankruptcies that are covered in the Lopucki Bankruptcy Research
Database (BRD)17. BRD has detailed information about bankruptcy cases, including the pre-
bankruptcy accounting information, judicial district, judge name, emerging information and
gvkey. For this period, BRD lists a total of 367 bankruptcy cases. The Widen Subcon
17The BRD contains data on all large, public company bankruptcy cases filed in the United States
Bankruptcy Courts from October 1, 1979 to present. A case is classified as “large” if debtor reported
assets or more than $100 million (measured in 1980 dollars) on the last form 10-K that the debtor filed with
the Securities Exchange Commission before filing the bankruptcy case.
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Database gather information from the original source material (such as confirmation orders,
disclosure statements and reorganization plans) for 315 of these cases using PACER and
supplemented it with some material obtained from private law firms and SEC filings18. Each
of these 315 cases are classified as either subcon or non-subcon.
As described in Widen (2006), in this classification, a case is considered as subcon case if
it was the federal bankruptcy case of a large, public company in which either (a) a settlement
of substantive consolidation litigation preceded approval of a reorganization plan or liquida-
tion or (b) a plan of reorganization or liquidation proposed substantive consolidation of two
or more entities involved in related bankruptcy proceedings. For the purposes of this classi-
fication, substantive consolidation was considered part of a bankruptcy plan or liquidation if
the plan or liquidation provided (i) for the actual combination of two or more legal entities,
(ii) for voting on the plan as if two or more entities were a single entity (whether or not the
plan combined the entities) or (iii) for distributions as if two or more entities were combined
(whether or not the plan combines the entities). If a debtor proposed that two or more
entities be consolidated prior to implementation of a plan, substantive consolidation was
considered part of the subsequent plan. In this database, “deemed consolidation”, the use of
substantive consolidation doctrine to justify consolidated distributions and voting without
actual combination of legal entities, is denoted as “substantive consolidation”. Since, my
experiment focused on the distributions to the lenders, this classification is in line with my
research question.
18PACER stands for Public Access to Court Electronic Records. It is an electronic public access service
that allows users to obtain case and docket information from federal appellate, district and bankruptcy
courts for a fee.
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2.3 Empirical Methodology
In this section, I present the details of the experiment for each hypothesis. However, as a
first step, I investigate whether some observable lender characteristics are related to subcon
exposure. This is important because it is possible that lenders with some ratios such as high
capitalization or low Non-Performing Loan/Total Assets are “good” lenders and not vulner-
able to shocks. If this is the case, then my experiment might capture some lender-specific
variables. Table 2.2 shows the logit regression, where the dependent variable is subcon
exposure of the bankrupt loan and the independent variables are various bank character-
istics including Lender Assets, Lender Capitalization, Tier1-Capital Ratio, Total Capital
Ratio, Non-Performing Loans/Total Assets, Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans and Non-
Performing Assets/Total Assets. The regression results show that none of the observable
bank characteristics are related to subcon exposure. The results support the claim that it is
difficult to predict the borrower’s subcon exposure.
Moreover, in Figure 2.2, I investigate visually whether patterns exist in which a group
of lenders can systematically escape from exposure. If subcon is unpredictable and has a
probability of 0.57 (mean value), then I would expect that with the increase in the num-
ber of bankruptcies, SubconRatio (Total number of subcon bankruptcies/Total number of
bankruptcies) would be close to 0.57. Similarly, the lenders that have a SubconRatio of 0 or
1 should have fewer bankruptcies. Figure2.2 shows that the lenders with the highest number
of bankruptcies have Subcon Ratios close to 0.6 and the lenders in the extremes have fewer
than 5 bankruptcies. Hence, this figure also supports the claim that it is difficult to predict
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the borrower’s subcon exposure.
2.3.1 Hypothesis-1
Hypothesis 1a:
“In the meantime, banks are considering what the decision [substantive consolidation] means
for the way they lend money. Some lenders are already becoming more conservative about
extending unsecured loans with guarantees, according to lawyers.”
Financial Times, January 14, 2005, “On Wall St: Ruling Raises Alarm”
In the first hypothesis about collateral requirement, I have two predictions. In the first
one, I am testing whether banks’ exposure to subcon causes them to write secured credit
more often. In the second one (Hypothesis 1b), I am testing whether an increase in subcon
exposure makes banks demand higher interest rates for their new unsecured loans, but not
for new secured ones.
To test the first prediction, I use the specification in (2.1), in which SECURED is a
binary variable denoting whether the bank loan is secured. SubConRatio is (Total number of
subcon bankruptcies)/(Total number of bankruptcies), and its calculation will be explained
in detail below. Y represents various control variables such as the Z-Score, Credit Rating,
Loan Amount and Tangibility. BankCap is the capitalization of the bank. i, l and t are the
borrower index, lender index and time index consecutively.
SECUREDi,t = αi + γt + ϕSubConRatiol,t−1 + ψYi,t + ρBankCapl,t−1 + εi,t (2.1)
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To gauge the bank’s subcon exposure, first, I merge all of the bankruptcies from the
2000-2005 period of the BRD database with LPC Dealscan using the link file provided by
Michael Roberts (as used in Chava and Roberts (2008)). I use this period because the Widen
Subcon Database have information only for this period. Then, using the lender information,
I extract the names and “ultimateparentid” of the banks who have unsecured existing credits
to these bankrupt companies. Hence, for each point in time and for each lender, I have the
exposure for the total number of unsecured bankruptcy exposure. In the next step, I merge
this dataset with the Widen Subcon Database to determine which ones are subcon cases. I
call the ratio of subcon cases to total bankruptcies, Subcon Ratio. Thus, if a bank has 4
bankruptcies in total and 3 of them are subcon cases, then its SubconRatio would be 0.75.
It is particular importance to note that SubconRatio is a time-varying parameter for each
lender and the regressions use the ratio at the time of package initialization.
One problem in the calculation of the SubconRatio is that some of the lenders did not have
bankruptcies during the sample period. Bankruptcy may be the result of poor monitoring,
and the lenders with at least one bankruptcy may be different than lenders without any.
Since I want to examine the differential effect of SubconRatio across similar banks, I require
the lenders to have at least one bankruptcy (subcon or not). However, the vast majority of
lenders in LPC Dealscan had at least one bankruptcy during that period.
Another important factor that may affect the collateral requirement is bank capitaliza-
tion. The sign of coefficient in bank capitalization change is unclear though. The depletion
of bank capital may cause banks to make lending less risky by writing more secured credits.
In contrast, banks may start gambling and write more unsecured credits. Hence, experiment
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also illuminates the banks’ reactions to the change in their capitalization.
In specification (2.1), there are several important things to consider. First, I use borrower
fixed effects to account for time-invariant company risk. Hence, fixing the borrower risk, I
test whether a bank’s recent subcon experience with previous loans yields a higher probability
of writing a secured loan in its subsequent loan origination. We can illustrate this regression
with an example: Company A borrows an unsecured loan in 2002 with a maturity of 3 years.
In 2005, the same company (Company A) wanted a new loan. I test whether lender exposure
to subcon in this period would result in the new loan being secured.
Another issue to consider in this regression is the presence of both time-series and cross
sectional heterogeneity. This is important because some banks may learn from other banks’
experiences, and the trend may pertain only to the time-series. To alleviate these concerns,
I include time fixed effects and observe the lending behavior change with respect to a bank’s
exposure to shocks.
Table2.3 shows the regression results for the specification in (2.1). The variable of interest
SubConRatio has a positive sign and is significant at 1% level in all regressions. Economi-
cally, it means that one standard deviation change (19.39) around the mean (57.22), increases
the probability of the loan being secured approximately 9.2% controlling for borrower risk.
In this specification, the Z-score (which increases as borrower risk is reduced) generally has a
negative sign and shows that risky borrowers generally pledge collateral to receive the loan.
Even though using borrower fixed effects can control time-invariant borrower character-
istics and provide a clean experiment, it requires the borrower to be in the sample at least
twice. Moreover, since regression uses variation in the dependent variable, at least one of
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these loans should be secured and one of them should be unsecured. These requirements
decrease the sample size drastically. Therefore, I run the same regression specified in (2.1)
without using borrower fixed effects. Table 2.4 shows the results. SubConRatio has a posi-
tive sign and is significant at 1% level in all regressions. As in Table2.3, the Z-score (which
increases as borrower risk is reduced) has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level,
confirming that risky borrowers pledge collateral to receive the loan. In all of the regressions,
lender capitalization has a negative sign and in some specifications statistically significant.
Hence, depletion of bank capital induces the lenders to take less risk instead of more. This
result is consistent with Murfin (forth.) findings.
Hypothesis 1b:
In the second part of Hypothesis1, I test whether an increase in subcon exposure causes a
lender to increase the interest rate for its new unsecured loans. In my experimental design, I
employ the regression equation in (2.2). In this specification, InterestRate is the basis points
over LIBOR for each facility. SubConRatio represents (Total number of subcon bankrupt-
cies)/(Total number of bankruptcies) as defined in Hypothesis1a. Unsecured is a binary
variable with a value of 1 if the bank loan is unsecured . SubConRatiol,t−1 × Unsecured
is the interaction of SubconRatio with Unsecured. Decrease in the lender capitalization in
the last quarter is ∆LenderCapt. Y represents the various control variables such as Z-Score,
Credit Rating, Loan Amount, Maturity and Tangibility. i, l and t are the borrower index,
lender index and time index respectively.
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InterestRatei,t = αi + γt + ϕ(SubConRatiol,t−1 × Unsecured) (2.2)
+ λ(SubConRatiol,t−1) + ρ(Unsecured)
+ ψ(∆LenderCapt) + µYi,t + εi,t
Many factors can affect the interest rates. One of these is the borrower’s riskiness. In
specification (2.2), αi is borrower fixed effects and controls for the time-invariant risk charac-
teristics. Moreover, I include S&P long-term credit ratings and Altman Z-Score to account
for the borrower risk. Interest rates can also be affected by the supply of capital in the mar-
ket. ∆LenderCapt captures lender-specific supply and γt, which is time fixed effect, controls
for the yearly fluctuations that are caused by macroeconomic factors. Our main interest is
the interaction term, SubConRatiol,t−1 × Unsecured. I predict that if the exposure of the
lender increases and they still lend an unsecured credit, then a higher interest rate would
be stipulated. This should produce a positive coefficient for the interaction term. Table 2.5
shows that the interaction term had a positive sign and is significant at the 5% significance
level except in the last regression.
2.3.2 Hypothesis-2
“The decision [substantive consolidation] has created “quite a bit of alarm” in the bank lend-
ing and investment community, according to the head of syndicated lending at one Wall Street
bank. Loan investors clearly thought they were senior to the bonds”
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Financial Times, January 14, 2005, “On Wall St: Ruling Raises Alarm”
In this hypothesis, I test whether an increase in subcon exposure causes a lender to write
stricter covenants in new unsecured loans. Since secured loans are already protected by
collateral and are not affected by subcon, I do not expect any increase in the covenants for
them.
For contract strictness, I use the measure developed in Murfin (forth.). This measure
summarizes covenant tightness as a probability of the lender’s allocating control via covenant
violation. The main intuition of the measure is as follows. Consider an N × 1 vector of r
financial ratios, which receive N -dimensional multivariate normal shocks, converting it to r′
as in (2.3). If the covenant for the ith element of r vector is written such that r
′
i < ri is a
covenant violation, then strictness can be calculated as in (2.4) where FN is the multivariate
CDF with mean 0 and a covariance matrix
∑
.
r′ = r + ε ∼ NN(0,
∑
) (2.3)
STRICTNESS ≡ p = 1− FN(r − r) (2.4)
To calculate the contract strictness, I first merge LPC Dealscan’s package-level data with
the covenant information to obtain thresholds and types of covenants. Then, I merge my this
sample with Compustat for the quarters in which the packages were initiated to obtain the
accounting information of the borrowers. Having minimum allowable ratios and accounting
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data for the quarters, I calculate the slack as the difference between the minimum allowable
ratio and the observed ratio (or the negative of the difference in the case of a maximum ratio)
for the following covenants: minimum EBITDA/debt, current ratio, quick ratio, tangible
net worth, total net worth, EBITDA, fixed charge coverage, interest coverage, maximum
debt/equity, debt/tangible net worth, capital expenditure and leverage ratio.
In the next step, I calculate the covariance matrix for the covenants mentioned in previous
paragraph. For all the Compustat firms with non-zero leverage, I calculate logged ratios for
each quarter at the 1-digit SIC level. Then, I subtract the lagged ratio from the current
ratio to find the change in each quarter. Using rolling ten-year windows of backward-looking
data for these changes, I obtain the covariance matrix for each quarter in my sample. With
a slack and covariance matrix for the covenants, I calculate the strictness measure for each
package as in equation (2.4).
In this experiment, I examine whether SubConRatio has different effects on unsecured vs.
secured loans. I predict that it would increase strictness in unsecured loans but not have any
effect on the secured loans. To demonstrate this difference, I run several tests. First, I utilize
specification (2.5) for secured and unsecured loans separately. Then, I run the regressions for
the whole sample as specified in (2.6) and determined whether (SubconRatio×Unsecured)
has the predicted sign.
STRICTNESSi,t = αi + γt + λSubConRatiol,t−1 + βXi,t + εi,t (2.5)
Table 2.6 shows the results of specification (2.5) for unsecured loans only. Our variable
of interest, SubconRatio, increases the unsecured loan strictness at a 5% significance level.
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If we interpret strictness as a the probability of lender’s control in the quarter, then using
the numbers in Column I of Table 2.6, for the median contract strictness level (9.01), a
one standard deviation (19.39) increase in SubConRatio increases the probability of lender
control in a year from 31.45% to 36.01%19. Chava and Roberts (2008) show that covenant
violations reduce investment by approximately 1% capital and Roberts and Sufi (2009) find
evidence that covenant violations reduce annual debt issuance by 2.5% of assets. Hence, my
results may be regarded as material to a firm’s real and financing decisions.
STRICTNESSi,t = αi + γt + ϕ(SubconRatioi,t−1 × Unsecured) (2.6)
+ λ(SubconRatioi,t−1) + ρ(Unsecured)
+ψLenderCapl,t + ηYi,t + εi,t
Table 2.7 shows the results of the same regressions for secured loans. SubconRatio is
not significant, which is in line with our expectations. Zscore has a negative sign and is
significant at the 10% level. Given that I also controll for S&P credit rating, Zscore seems
to have captured the borrower riskiness well. Table 2.8 presents the results for specification
(2.6). Our variable of interest is the interaction term, SubConRatio ×Unsecured. It is
positive and significant at 10% significance level.
19I calculate the probability of a violation until time T as
T∑
i=1
p(1− p)i−1
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2.3.3 Are Main Findings Consistent with Rational Hypothesis?
Rational arguments would suggest that at the onset of heating of judical debates, all lenders
would react to subcon news, yielding a time series increase in the collateral demands. To
test this hypothesis, I investigate whether there was an increase in the frequency of ini-
tiation of secured loan starting in 2003, the year subcon was at the heart of WorldCom
and Kmart’s 20 reorganization plans. In WorldCom case, some claims amounting to $750
million received only %44 recovery while they should have got full recovery of 113% (rep-
resenting principal and post-petition interest) without subcon. The unexpected shock to
these creditors appeared in media21 and was harshly criticized among law scholars22. Ac-
cording to practitioners23, a lot of facts that were cited to support for subcon in WorldCom
bankruptcy present also in many multicorporate businesses and has implications in the sub-
sequent cases. In the next section, I briefly discuss how subcon affected the distribution to
creditors in WorldCom case.
2.3.3.1 WorldCom Bankruptcy Case
On July 21, 2002, WorldCom filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection as the largest such
filing in United States history at the time (since overtaken by the bankruptcies of both
Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual in September 2008) with $41 billion debt load,
20Subcon diluted the unsecured bank loan recovery and increased the junior bond recovery. The issue was
also explicitly stated in Kmart’s SEC filings: “substantive consolidation would harm the banks in violation
of one of the key requirements that substantive consolidation be in the best interest of all creditors...because
if the Kmart entities were substantively consolidated, the Subsidiary Guarantees would be eliminated... and
[the bank’s] anticipated recovery on that single claim would be diluted by the claims of all other unsecured
creditors.”, January 24, 2003, 8-K reports.
21“MCI Investors Learn Promises Can Be Broken”, 05/02/2003, New York Times
22Baird (2005) states: “...the court might have been able to do more than simply throw up his hands.”
23http://metropolitancorporatecounsel.com/articles/4030/worldcom-mci-and-second-circuits-substantive-
consolidation-doctrine-asserting-creditor
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$24 billion of which is in bonds. One of the biggest challenges in the reorganization plan was
the subcon decision. Since some of the credits were on the parent level and some were on
the subsidiary level, pooling of the assets dramatically changed the priorities and recoveries.
The problem was especially severe for a group of investors of MCI, which was acquired by
WorldCom on November 4, 1997 for $37 billion, making it the largest corporate merger
of US history at that time. After acquisition, MCI became a wholly owned subsidiary of
Worldcom.
In 1996, when there was no acquisition news, MCI issued $750 mil. 8% Cumulative
Quarterly Income Preferred Securities (QUIPS)24, which functionally represented subordi-
nated claim against MCI. Additionally, before merger it issued $2.59 billion of senior bonds.
From these investors’ perspective, as a standalone company MCI was quite promising with
strong market power and financial standing. It was the second largest carrier of long-distance
telecommunications services in the U.S. and the second largest carrier of international long-
distance telecommunications services in the world. Moreover, it had quite financial standing
with annual $4 billion EBITDA. After the merger, MCI performed its operations legally as
a “separate entity” and continued to be an obligor to QUIPS and bond investors25.
As MCI is legally a separate entity, WorldCom creditors have no claim on MCI assets
24In re: WorldCom Inc, et al. “MCI issued the QUIPS through a somewhat complex mechanism. First,
it created a wholly owned Delaware statutory business trust called MCI Capital I, of which MCI owned all
the common stock. MCI Capital I then issued $750 million aggregate principal amount of 8% Cumulative
Quarterly Income Preferred Securities – the QUIPS – and used the proceeds to purchase $750 million of
8.00% Junior Subordinated Deferrable Interest Debentures (the “QUIDs”) issued by MCI Communications
Corp. Thus, the QUID5 were debt instruments of MCI that earn 8% annual interest, payable quarterly
but deferrable so long as MCI does not pay dividends. MCI Capital Trust I merely held the QUIDs and
distributed the resulting cash flow to the QUIPS holders.”
25In re: WorldCom Inc, et al., Application of the Dissenting MCI Bondholders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Aˆ§
503(b) For Allowance of Administrative Expenses Incurred in Making A Substantial Contribution in These
Chapter 11 Cases. Case No. 02-13533 (AJG)
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other than through Worldcom’s ownership of the MCI equity. Therefore, MCI creditors were
entitled to be paid in full before their shareholder, WorldCom, could receive any value to
pay to its creditors. MCI had operating subsidiaries comprising at least 90% of WorldCom’s
operating value. Hence, it had sufficient assets to pay in full to QUIPS investors and its
senior bond holders. Considering the fact that at the time of investment MCI creditors relied
on the creditworthiness of MCI, not WorldCom, and that MCI operated always as a legally
separate entity after the merger, MCI investors clearly thought that they should get 100%
recovery26. However, the situation changed when the WorldCom assets were substantive
consolidated. Since in this bankruptcy technique assets are pooled, MCI investors were
subordinated to WorldCom creditors. At the end of the settlement $750 million QUIPS
investors and $2.59 billion MCI senior bond investors received only 44% and 80% recovery
respectively while they should have got full recovery of 113% (representing principal and
post-petition interest).
2.3.3.2 Empirical Testing for Aggregate Movement
In this section, I test whether there was an aggregate reaction in the market to substantive
consolidation of WorldCom assets. I hypothesize that if market reacts to this case, then
there should be an increasing collateral demand in 2003 and afterwards. Figure2.11 shows
the collateralized loan ratio in 1996-2009 period. In the figure, y axis refers to (Total Amount
of Secured Loans)/ (Total Amount of Loans) for loans that were originated in US and have
information in secured field in LPC Dealscan Database. Consistent with our hypothesis,
there is a sharp increase starting with 2003 and the level stays quite persistent in post-2003
26“MCI Investors Learn Promises Can Be Broken”, 05/02/2003, New York Times
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period. One interesting observation in this figure is the high secured ratio in 1998. This
peak may be associated with 1998 Russian financial crisis. Hence, we get some evidence
that macroeconomic conditions may also have a role in determining collateral demand in the
market.
Securedi,t = αPost−WorldCom+βi,tZscorei,t+δTangibilityi,t+φLog(LenderCapi,t)+ωYi,t+εi,t
(2.7)
Even though Figure2.11 shows a sharp increase in collateral demand starting in 2003,
it may be the case that in our treatment period only risky firms may have got the loans,
inflating the secured ratio. Therefore, I use the regression equation (2.7) to formally test
that in Post-WorldCom period, there is an increase in collateral demand even we control for
the company risk. In this specification, the dependent variable Securedi,t is a binary variable
that takes the value 1 if loan is secured and 0 otherwise. Post −WorldCom is a dummy
variable indicating whether the package was initialized in 2003 or afterwards. Yi,t refers to
various independent variables including firm credit rating, loan maturity and amount. In
equation (2.7), our main variable of interest is α, which indicates whether there was an
aggregate increase in demand in post-WorldCom period. Table2.11 shows the regression
results. We see that α is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Economically it
means that at the secured ratio mean level (0.54), a loan has (8%) higher probability to be
a secured loan if it was started in 2003 or afterwards.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate whether uncertainties in bankruptcy techniques provide an im-
portant friction for the syndicated loan market. In my experiment, I use one of the most
debated issues in U.S bankruptcy courts, substantive consolidation. In this technique, exist-
ing seniorities are eliminated, resulting in large losses for the unsecured bank loans. I show
that an increase in the subcon exposure of the lenders affects the loans they will write for
their other clients. I find that increases in lender’s subcon exposure increase the probability
that their new loans will be written on a secured basis. Moreover, if they provide unsecured
ones, as compensation they demand higher interest rates and tighter covenants.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. To my knowledge, it is the first
paper to show that uncertainties in U.S bankruptcy procedures provide important frictions
and affect syndicated loan markets. The results are interesting because US bankruptcy
procedures are known to be highly efficient and inspirational to the rest of the world.
Smith and Stromberg (2005) explain that the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France
and Sweden have all instituted more debtor-friendly, U.S.-styled reorganization codes into
their bankruptcy laws. My results show that some important frictions still remain in proba-
bly the most efficient bankruptcy system. Furthermore, my paper complements the previous
literature on determinants of equilibrium contracts by providing a new channel. My findings
show that these frictions play a significant role in explaining a loan’s collateral requirement,
interest rate and covenant strictness. Considering that some firms do not have sufficient as-
sets to pledge as collateral because the assets have already been pledged in the firm’s existing
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debt, such financially constrained companies may have difficulty in creating new liquidity.
This is particularly important for policy makers who want to ease bank lending standards
during a financial crisis.
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2.5 Tables
Table 2.1:
Summary Statistics
In this table, Panel A presents summary statistics of merged DealScan-Compustat sample at the package
level for non-financial companies in 2000-2007 period. Loans that do not have start and end date or maturity
were eliminated. Sample include only the packages, which were originated in the United States. Borrowers
with missing assets or negative sales information were excluded from the sample. Panel B (in the next page)
is the sub-sample for which lead arrangers and covenant information exists.
Panel A: DealScan-Compustat Sample
N Mean 10thpct 50thpct 90thpct Std. Dev.
Firm Characteristics
Assets ($Bil) 14,177 5.684 0.102 1.395 20.721 8.948
Leverage Ratio 14,177 0.335 0.064 0.300 0.595 0.259
EBITDA/Assets 12,446 0.109 0.029 0.116 0.216 0.183
Current Ratio 14,177 1.739 0.709 1.381 2.938 1.885
Zscore 11,759 2.067 0.123 1.429 4.569 5.115
S&P Long-Term Debt Rating 7,946 10.36 6 10 15 3.65
Loan Characteristics
Loan Amount ($M) 14,178 544 20 200 1,210 1,390
Maturity (months) 13,504 44.98 12 47 73 28.44
Secured 8,836 0.70 0 1 1 0.45
(to be continued in the next page)
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Table 2.1: Continued
Summary Statistics
In this table, Panel A (in the previous page) presents summary statistics of merged DealScan-Compustat
sample at the package level for non-financial companies in 2000-2007 period. Loans that do not have start
and end date or maturity were eliminated. Sample include only the packages, which were originated in the
United States. Borrowers with missing assets or negative sales information were excluded from the sample.
Panel B is the sub-sample of A for which lead arrangers and covenant information exists. SubconRatio is
a time varying variable for each lender and calculated as the ratio of number of total subcon cases to total
number of bankruptcy cases, in which lender’s role was lead arranger in the syndication. Definition of other
variables were provided in the Appendix.
Panel B: DealScan-Compustat-Covenant Sample(2000-2007)
N Mean 10thpct 50thpct 90thpct Std. Dev.
Lender Characteristics
Subcon Ratio (multiplied by 100) 1,941 57.22 33.33 57.14 75 19.39
Total Lender Assets($Mil) 1,415 675.68 74.30 719.48 1,148.44 358.46
Lender Capitalization 1,270 7.02% 4.45% 6.97% 9.23% 1.95%
Non−PerformingLoans
TotalLoans 1,367 1.32% 0.54% 1.08% 2.17% 1.01%
Non−PerformingLoans
TotalAssets 1,367 0.55% 0.21% 0.43% 0.91% 0.50%
Tier1 Capital Ratio 1,365 8.64% 7.51% 8.31% 9.65% 1.50%
Total Capital Ratio 1,365 12.27% 11.04% 12% 13.2% 1.47%
Loan Characteristics
Contract Strictness 2,031 16.63 0.003 9.01 46.17 19.71
Loan Amount ($M) 2,148 1,090 25 450 3,000 1,790
Maturity (months) 2,148 42.15 12 48 60 22.38
Secured 1,867 0.45 0 0 1 0.49
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Table 2.1: Continued
Summary Statistics
In this table, Panel A (in the previous page) presents summary statistics of merged DealScan-Compustat
sample at the package level for non-financial companies in 2000-2007 period. Loans that do not have start
and end date or maturity were eliminated. Sample include only the packages, which were originated in the
United States. Borrowers with missing assets or negative sales information were excluded from the sample.
Panel B is the sub-sample of A for which lead arrangers and covenant information exists. SubconRatio is
a time varying variable for each lender and calculated as the ratio of number of total subcon cases to total
number of bankruptcy cases, in which lender’s role was lead arranger in the syndication. Definition of other
variables were provided in the Appendix.
Panel B: DealScan-Compustat-Covenant Sample(2000-2007)
N Mean 10thpct 50thpct 90thpct Std. Dev.
Firm Characteristics
Assets ($Bil) 2,148 6.579 0.132 2.634 22.332 8.920
Leverage Ratio 2,148 0.273 0.015 0.279 0.489 0.196
EBITDA/Assets 2,030 0.127 0.053 0.121 0.235 0.108
Current Ratio 2,148 1.777 0.765 1.482 3.100 1.164
Zscore 1,836 2.548 0.354 1.768 5.868 3.833
S&P Long-Term Debt Rating 1,431 9.466 6 9 14 3.210
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Table 2.2:
Bank Characteristics for Predicting Subcon
This table reports logit regressions, where the dependent variable, Subcon, takes a value of 1 it was a subcon
case. Independent variables are the characteristics of the lenders, who had existing unsecured credit at the
time the debtor filed bankruptcy. Definition of the independent variables are provided in the Appendix.
Dependent Variable: SUBCON (0-1 Variable)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log(Loan Amount) -0.00991 0.163 0.0847 0.0525 0.118 -0.0415 -0.102 -0.112
(-0.01) (0.26) (0.13) (0.08) (0.18) (-0.06) (-0.15) (-0.17)
Maturity 0.164 0.163 0.0761 0.170 0.131 0.211 0.185 0.175
(0.67) (0.71) (0.33) (0.69) (0.54) (0.90) (0.76) (0.71)
Log(Bank Assets) 0.314 0.313 0.258 0.234 0.311 0.366 0.415* 0.322 0.282
(1.14) (1.15) (0.98) (0.95) (1.14) (1.38) (1.80) (1.17) (1.04)
Bank Capitilization -0.126 -0.125 -0.131 -0.285 -0.156 -0.213 -0.212 -0.921 -0.753
(-0.65) (-0.66) (-0.68) (-0.16) (-0.83) (-1.26) (-1.45) (-0.49) (-0.43)
Tier-1 Capital Ratio 0.175 0.174 0.137 0.172 0.217 0.0546 0.189 0.205 0.193
(0.64) (0.67) (0.52) (0.63) (0.82) (0.25) (0.70) (0.75) (0.71)
Total Capital Ratio -0.164 -0.164 -0.151 -0.222 -0.232 -0.0802 -0.101 -0.186 -0.196
(-0.76) (-0.77) (-0.70) (-1.05) (-1.22) (-0.47) (-0.53) (-0.87) (-0.93)
Nonperformingloans
TotalLoans
0.397 0.398 0.446 0.763 0.642 0.436 0.133 0.390 0.527
(0.68) (0.70) (0.77) (1.54) (1.43) (0.74) (0.25) (0.67) (0.96)
Nonperformingloans
TotalAssets
-0.316 -0.317 -0.327 -0.323 -0.279 -0.338 -0.298 -0.320 -0.138
(-1.01) (-1.02) (-1.04) (-1.04) (-0.94) (-1.07) (-0.95) (-1.00) (-1.18)
Nonperformingassets
TotalAssets
0.198 0.199 0.192 0.132 0.112 0.221 0.242 0.277 -0.0992
(0.62) (0.62) (0.59) (0.42) (0.40) (0.68) (0.75) (0.89) (-0.84)
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 105 104 104 104
pseudo R-sq 0.064 0.064 0.061 0.054 0.061 0.061 0.056 0.061 0.056 0.061
Log lik. -64.40 -64.40 -64.63 -65.06 -64.62 -64.61 -65.42 -64.64 -64.96 -64.61
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.3:
Subcon Exposure and Secured Loan (with Borrower Fixed Effects)
This table reports logit regressions, where the dependent variable, Secured, takes a value of 1 if the loan is
a secured loan. SubconRatio is a time varying variable for each lender and calculated as the ratio of number
of total subcon cases to total number of bankruptcy cases. It was multiplied by 100 to be represented in
percentages. The regression includes borrower fixed effects, year fixed effects and S&P Long Term Debt
Rating dummy variables for each rating. Explanations of other independent variables are provided in the
Appendix.
Dependent Variable: SECURED (0-1 Variable)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Subcon Ratio 0.00415*** 0.00384*** 0.00421*** 0.00424*** 0.00400*** 0.00408*** 0.00416 ***
(2.64) (2.67) (3.11) (2.91) (2.77) (2.63) (2.72)
Zscore -0.465*** -0.453 -0.487 -0.461*** -0.422*** -0.465
(-4.76) (-1.18) (-1.19) (-4.86) (-4.52) (-1.17)
Tangibility 0.0108 0.00321 0.0122 0.0104 0.00995 0.0109
(1.00) (0.31) (0.81) (0.97) (1.02) (0.78)
Log(Assets) 0.128 0.219 0.135 0.159 0.111 0.134
(1.27) (0.57) (0.90) (1.62) (1.15) (0.91)
Lender Capitilization -0.103 -0.105 -0.102 -0.104 -0.116 -0.103
(-1.23) (-0.53) (-0.86) (-0.87) (-1.42) (-0.86)
Log(Maturity) 0.216*** 0.199 0.217 0.216 0.213*** 0.217
(5.16) (0.58) (1.19) (1.19) (5.21) (1.18)
Log(Loan Amount) 0.00687 0.0177 0.00940 0.0154 0.000752 0.0300
(0.24) (0.44) (0.32) (0.50) (0.03) (1.09)
Rating Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Borrower Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 1145 1193 1145 1145 1160 1145 1145
pseudo R-sq 0.437 0.410 0.436 0.436 0.424 0.419 0.437
Log lik. -446.3 -487.3 -447.0 -447.1 -462.1 -460.7 -446.3
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.4:
Subcon Exposure and Secured Loan (without Borrower Fixed Effects)
This table reports marginal effects of logit regressions, where the dependent variable, Secured, takes a value
of 1 if the loan is a secured loan. SubconRatio is a time varying variable for each lender and calculated
as the ratio of number of total subcon cases to total number of bankruptcy cases. It was multiplied by
100 to be represented in percentages. The regression includes year fixed effects and S&P Long Term Debt
Rating dummy variables for each rating. Explanations of other independent variables are provided in the
Appendix.
Dependent Variable: SECURED (0-1 Variable)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Subcon Ratio 0.00319*** 0.00348*** 0.00324*** 0.00299*** 0.00355*** 0.00324*** 0.00317***
(4.03) (4.42) (4.07) (3.79) (4.81) (4.13) (4.00)
Zscore -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.0917*** -0.103*** -0.0952*** -0.106***
(-5.85) (-5.71) (-5.18) (-5.71) (-5.25) (-5.85)
Tangibility 0.00225 0.00149 0.00254 0.00201 0.00216 0.00230
(1.39) (0.99) (1.56) (1.27) (1.36) (1.42)
Log(Assets) -0.0509*** -0.0306** -0.0523*** -0.0474*** -0.0754*** -0.0422***
(-3.81) (-2.35) (-3.89) (-3.61) (-5.74) (-4.08)
Lender Capitalization -0.0606 -0.0813** -0.0589 -0.0580 -0.0578 -0.0646
(-1.50) (-2.02) (-1.45) (-1.43) (-1.44) (-1.60)
Log(Maturity) 0.148*** 0.162*** 0.150*** 0.167*** 0.143*** 0.154***
(7.47) (8.05) (7.49) (8.53) (7.33) (8.02)
Log(Loan Amount) 0.0122 0.00453 0.0129 -0.0163* 0.00811 0.0382***
(1.03) (0.38) (1.07) (-1.75) (0.70) (3.34)
Rating Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Borrower Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
N 4031 4031 4031 4031 4031 4031 4031
pseudo R-sq 0.546 0.538 0.545 0.544 0.541 0.546 0.535
Log lik. -1272.4 -1386.0 -1273.7 -1279.0 -1303.2 -1272.8 -1303.7
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.5:
Interest Rate Spread (without Borrower Fixed Effects)
This table reports regressions of the interaction term, SubConRatio×Unsecured, and other related variables
to interest rate spread. The regression is performed on facility level (i.e, not package) since credit line and
loans have different interest rates. Loan dummies control for term loans and credit lines. The dependent
variable, interest rate spread, is used in basis points. Unsecured is a binary variable, taking a value of 1 if the
facility is an unsecured loan. SubconRatio is a time varying variable for each lender and calculated as the ratio
of number of total subcon cases to total number of bankruptcy cases, in which lender’s role was lead arranger
in the syndication. It was multiplied by 100 to be represented in percentages. ∆LenderCap, indicates the
depreciation of lender capitalization in the last quarter. The regression includes year fixed effects and S&P
Long Term Debt Rating dummy variables for each rating. Explanations of other independent variables are
provided in the Appendix.
Dependent Variable: Interest Rate Spread
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SubConRatio× Unsecured 0.285** 0.250** 0.268** 0.266** 0.261** 0.212* 0.283** 0.204
(2.26) (2.08) (2.11) (2.23) (2.08) (1.65) (2.24) (1.59)
SubCon Ratio 0.396*** 0.373*** 0.419*** 0.383*** 0.346*** 0.362*** 0.397*** 0.364***
(5.32) (5.25) (5.59) (5.32) (4.85) (4.78) (5.33) (4.80)
Unsecured -0.381*** -0.426*** -0.402*** -0.407*** -0.393*** -0.459*** -0.376*** -0.451***
(-4.33) (-5.07) (-4.55) (-4.89) (-4.48) (-5.14) (-4.28) (-5.04)
∆LenderCap 0.591* 0.667** 0.579* 0.461 0.660** 0.596* 0.673**
(1.84) (2.06) (1.88) (1.45) (2.02) (1.85) (2.05)
Log(Assets) 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.975*** -0.021 0.102*** 0.0871
(8.36) (9.03) (9.70) (8.16) (-0.22) (8.67) (0.09)
Zscore -0.928*** -0.948*** -1.051*** -0.927*** -0.912*** -0.943*** -0.949***
(-6.71) (-6.89) (-7.60) (-6.70) (-6.48) (-6.85) (-6.76)
Lender Cap. 0.877** 0.637* 0.628* 0.730** 0.453 0.887** 0.466
(2.44) (1.88) (1.75) (2.13) (1.25) (2.47) (1.28)
Log(Loan Amount) -0.189*** -0.196*** -0.122*** -0.189*** -0.186*** -0.191***
(-14.21) (-15.01) (-11.43) (-14.83) (-14.05) (-14.50)
Log(Loan Maturity) -0.266 -0.100 -0.531*** -0.369* -0.281 -0.633***
(-1.32) (-0.51) (-2.65) (-1.92) (-1.39) (-3.10)
Rating Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Borrower Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Loan Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 5627 5768 5627 6005 5630 5627 5627 5627
Adj. R-sq 0.625 0.623 0.621 0.630 0.625 0.612 0.625 0.611
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.6:
Contract Strictness (for Unsecured Loans)
This table reports regressions of SubConRatio, and other related variables to contract strictness for the
sample of unsecured loans. The dependent variable, contact strictness, is used in percentages. SubconRatio
is a time varying variable for each lender and calculated as the ratio of number of total subcon cases to
total number of bankruptcy cases. It was multiplied by 100 to be represented in percentages. The regression
includes year fixed effects and S&P Long Term Debt Rating dummy variables for each rating. Explanations
of other independent variables are provided in the Appendix.
Dependent Variable: Contract Strictness
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SubCon Ratio 0.0876** 0.0876** 0.0913** 0.0890** 0.0828** 0.0800** 0.0873** 0.0871**
(2.21) (2.21) (2.35) (2.24) (2.09) (2.03) (2.20) (2.20)
Zscore -2.660*** -2.660*** -2.004** -2.170** -2.701*** -2.613*** -2.672***
(-2.77) (-2.77) (-2.19) (-2.31) (-2.81) (-2.74) (-2.79)
Tangibility 0.316** 0.316** 0.154 0.308** 0.304** 0.312** 0.313**
(2.21) (2.21) (1.14) (2.15) (2.13) (2.19) (2.20)
Log(Assets) -1.850** -1.850** -1.171 -1.806** -1.759** -1.874** -1.973***
(-2.31) (-2.31) (-1.54) (-2.25) (-2.20) (-2.35) (-3.34)
Lender Cap -3.592 -3.592 -3.021 -3.315 -3.303 -3.492 -3.611
(-1.40) (-1.40) (-1.21) (-1.29) (-1.28) (-1.37) (-1.41)
Log(Loan Maturity) 0.362 0.362 -0.130 0.251 0.511 0.259 0.327
(0.42) (0.42) (-0.15) (0.29) (0.59) (0.30) (0.38)
Log(Loan Amount) -0.187 -0.187 -0.464 -0.0300 -1.458** -0.238 -0.127
(-0.23) (-0.23) (-0.59) (-0.04) (-2.41) (-0.29) (-0.16)
Rating Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Borrower Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
N 737 737 788 737 737 739 737 737
Adj. R-sq 0.096 0.096 0.095 0.091 0.090 0.096 0.097 0.097
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.7:
Contract Strictness (for Secured Loans)
This table reports regressions of SubConRatio, and other related variables to contract strictness for the
sample of secured loans. The dependent variable, contact strictness, is used in percentages. SubconRatio is
a time varying variable for each lender and calculated as the ratio of number of total subcon cases to total
number of bankruptcy cases. It was multiplied by 100 to be represented in percentages. The regression
includes year fixed effects and S&P Long Term Debt Rating dummy variables for each rating. Explanations
of other independent variables are provided in the Appendix.
Dependent Variable: Contract Strictness
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Subcon Ratio -0.0449 -0.0449 -0.0511 -0.0483 -0.0417 -0.0311 -0.0440 -0.0436
(-0.81) (-0.81) (-0.91) (-0.87) (-0.73) (-0.59) (-0.79) (-0.79)
Zscore -2.440** -2.440** -2.516** -2.257** -2.422** -2.386** -2.449**
(-2.30) (-2.30) (-2.37) (-2.08) (-2.28) (-2.27) (-2.31)
Tangibility -0.00491 -0.00491 -0.00488 -0.00515* -0.00491 -0.00479 -0.00497*
(-1.63) (-1.63) (-1.59) (-1.68) (-1.63) (-1.60) (-1.66)
Log(Assets) -4.909*** -4.909*** -5.382*** -4.948*** -4.742*** -5.051*** -4.692***
(-4.06) (-4.06) (-4.47) (-4.08) (-3.93) (-4.37) (-5.73)
Log(Lender Cap) -0.346 -0.346 -1.444 -0.643 0.263 -0.370 -0.347
(-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.49) (-0.22) (0.09) (-0.13) (-0.12)
Log(Loan Maturity) 0.882 0.882 -1.108 0.546 3.371 0.783 1.087
(0.41) (0.41) (-0.52) (0.26) (1.61) (0.37) (0.55)
Log(Loan Amount) 0.321 0.321 1.557 0.513 -3.600*** 0.355 0.534
(0.24) (0.24) (1.20) (0.39) (-3.94) (0.27) (0.44)
Rating Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Borrower Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
N 364 364 378 364 364 367 364 364
Adj. R-sq 0.151 0.151 0.131 0.146 0.111 0.141 0.153 0.153
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.8:
Contract Strictness (with Borrower Fixed Effects)
This table reports regressions of SubConRatio×Unsecured, and other related variables to contract strictness.
The dependent variable, contact strictness, is used in percentages. Unsecured is a binary variable, taking a
value of 1 if the package is an unsecured loan. SubconRatio is a time varying variable for each lender and
calculated as the ratio of number of total subcon cases to total number of bankruptcy cases. It was multiplied
by 100 to be represented in percentages. The regression includes borrower fixed effects, year fixed effects and
S&P Long Term Debt Rating dummy variables for each rating. Explanations of other independent variables
are provided in the Appendix.
Dependent Variable: Contract Strictness
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SubConRatio
×Unsecured 0.118* 0.118* 0.115* 0.119* 0.108* 0.0895 0.116* 0.118*
(1.91) (1.91) (1.88) (1.93) (1.74) (1.50) (1.89) (1.92)
Unsecured -9.323** -9.323** -8.283** -9.396** -9.045** -7.739* -9.276** -9.325**
(-2.26) (-2.26) (-2.01) (-2.27) (-2.17) (-1.91) (-2.25) (-2.26)
Subcon Ratio -0.0393 -0.0393 -0.0346 -0.0408 -0.0358 -0.0185 -0.0380 -0.0394
(-0.80) (-0.80) (-0.70) (-0.83) (-0.72) (-0.39) (-0.78) (-0.81)
Zscore -2.378*** -2.378*** -2.410*** -1.929*** -2.410*** -2.336*** -2.378***
(-3.49) (-3.49) (-3.54) (-2.84) (-3.54) (-3.45) (-3.49)
Tangibility -0.00412 -0.00412 -0.00444 -0.00407 -0.00423 -0.00406 -0.00412
(-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.59) (-1.46) (-1.53) (-1.47) (-1.49)
Log(Assets) -2.949*** -2.949*** -2.619*** -2.945*** -2.836*** -3.003*** -2.962***
(-4.49) (-4.49) (-4.08) (-4.48) (-4.32) (-4.61) (-6.21)
Log(Lender Cap) -2.104 -2.104 -2.517 -2.226 -1.749 -2.043 -2.104
(-1.10) (-1.10) (-1.34) (-1.17) (-0.91) (-1.07) (-1.10)
Log(Loan Maturity) 0.503 0.503 -0.208 0.457 0.998 0.439 0.498
(0.61) (0.61) (-0.26) (0.56) (1.22) (0.54) (0.62)
Log(Loan Amount) -0.0191 -0.0191 0.144 0.0162 -2.105*** -0.0198 0.0771
(-0.03) (-0.03) (0.22) (0.02) (-4.25) (-0.03) (0.12)
Rating Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Borrower Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 1101 1101 1166 1101 1101 1106 1101 1101
Adj. R-sq 0.145 0.145 0.134 0.144 0.130 0.142 0.145 0.146
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.9:
Collateral Demand after WorldCom
Dependent Variable: SECURED (0-1 Variable)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Post-WorldCom 0.319*** 0.344*** -0.0561 0.199*** 0.524*** 0.313*** 0.518***
(4.21) (4.57) (-0.81) (2.78) (7.24) (4.14) (7.19)
Zscore -0.967*** -0.943*** -0.729*** -0.908*** -0.971*** -0.969*** -0.982***
(-20.07) (-19.86) (-17.69) (-20.49) (-20.14) (-20.14) (-20.45)
Tangibility 0.0244*** 0.0336*** 0.0253*** 0.0249*** 0.0244*** 0.0248***
(4.81) (6.52) (5.09) (4.93) (4.81) (4.95)
Log(Assets) -1.051*** -1.072*** -0.994*** -1.204*** -1.016*** -1.037***
(-21.12) (-21.64) (-21.06) (-25.04) (-29.37) (-29.93)
Log(Lender Cap) -0.807*** -0.815*** -0.699*** -0.745*** -0.807*** -0.740***
(-6.37) (-6.45) (-5.86) (-6.04) (-6.37) (-6.02)
Log(Loan Maturity) 0.615*** 0.617*** 0.958*** 0.590*** 0.632***
(11.33) (11.42) (18.80) (11.26) (12.36)
Log(Loan Amount) 0.0415 0.0413 -0.711*** 0.0180 0.202***
(0.97) (0.97) (-24.56) (0.44) (5.19)
N 5384 5385 5384 5861 5384 5384 5384
Adj. R-sq 0.264 0.259 0.187 0.260 0.244 0.264 0.241
Log. Likelihood -2559.1 -2576.6 -2825.6 -2746.8 -2626.2 -2559.5 -2639.1
t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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2.6 Figures
Figure 2.1: Owens Corning Bankruptcy
This figure shows a simplified version of the situation in the Owens Corning bankruptcy case. In this
representation, Subsidiaries 1 and 2 stand for the significant assets that provided the guarantees for the
loans. Subsidiary 3 represents a group of nonsignificant subsidiaries, valued at less than $30 million, which
did not provide guarantees. Although the bank loans were written at the parent level, the banks had claims
to both Subsidiaries 1 and 2 because they provided guarantees. Hence, the effective lender claims in those
subsidiaries were also $2 billion. The noteholders had claims only on the parent company at a value of $4
billion. The last row shows the consolidated values for the company assets and creditor claims.
Due to 
Interliability
Agreements
Entity Asset Value Noteholder
Claims
Bank Loan Lender 
Claims
Parent $980 mil $4billion $2billion $2billion
Subsidiary 1 $1 billion 0 0 $2billion
Subsidiary 2 $1 billion 0 0 $2billion
Subsidiary 3 $20 million 0 0 0   
Consolidated $3 billion $4billion $2billion N/A
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Figure 2.2: Total Number of Bankruptcies vs Subcon Ratio
This figure shows each lender in the sample by total bankruptcies and subcon exposure. “Total Number of
Bankruptcies” is the lender’s all bankruptcies, in which it had existing unsecured loans at the time debtor
filed bankruptcy. SubconRatio is calculated as the ratio of number of total subcon cases to total number of
bankruptcy cases. This figure was plotted for each lender’s end-of-period values.
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Figure 2.3
Frequency of Substantive Consolidation By Asset Size
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Number of Days in Bankruptcy By Asset Size
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Figure 2.5
Frequency of Substantive Consolidation By Jurisdiction
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Figure 2.6
Frequency of Substantive Consolidation By Jurisdiction
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Figure 2.7
Frequency of Substantive Consolidation By Year
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Figure 2.8
Frequency of Substantive Consolidation By Year 
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Figure 2.9
Percentage of Bankruptcy Filings By Jurisdiction           
DE 37%
SDNY 20%
Other 43%
Figure 2.10
Percentage of Bankruptcy Filings By Jurisdiction in Jumbo Cases (>$1bil.)
DE 35%
SDNY 31%
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Figure 2.11: Aggregate Market Movement to WorldCom Substantive Consolidation
This figure shows the time-series secured ratio, (Total amount of secured loans)/ (Total Amount of Loans),
for all loans that were originated in US and have information in secured field in LPC Dealscan Database. All
facilities were aggregated under packages using “packageid”. Following Chava and Roberts (2008), earliest
facility start date was used for package initialization date.
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Appendix A
Patent Lawsuits
A.1 Patent Lawsuit Defense Mechanisms
A.1.1 Invalidity
In US, a patent application is filed with United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
and examined by patent examiners to assess whether the invention satisfy patenting require-
ments. Even though USPTO grants a patent, an alleged infringer may assert that, patent
should be invalidated because the inventor failed to comply with the basic requirements for
patentability. About invalidity defense, there are several doctrines that an alleged infringer
may ground his arguments. These doctrines can be based in three broad categories: doc-
trines that ensure invention is a major contribution to the existing art; doctrines that ensure
an invention is fully disclosed to the public; doctrines that ensure inventions are in the scope
of patentable subjects.
First, to be a major contribution, pursuant to 35 U.S.C §101, an invention should be “new
and useful” and, pursuant to §103, it should be “nonobvious”. To have “new and useful”
property, an invention should have two elements: utility and novelty, as described in §102.
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In litigations, typically the utility requirement is not difficult to meet for the patent holders.
Therefore, the issue on validity decision generally centers on the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements. To be considered novel, an invention must not be wholly anticipated by the
so called “prior art” or public domain materials such as publications and other patents.
Nonobviousness doctrine adds to this by requiring that an invention not have been obvious
to a person having ordinary skill in the art as of the time of invention.
Second, a patent should be fully disclosed to the public with a written description, best-
mode and definiteness requirements. The written description and definiteness ensure that
public knows the boundaries of a patent so that they would better predict whether their
product falls into the domain of patent’s claims. Best-mode doctrine, however, is related for
the term after a patent expired. It requires that details of the invention is fully disclosed
so that someone who is skilled in the art of the invention can easily build upon the written
description.
Thirdly, the invention should be in the scope of the patentable subjects. 35 USC §101
lists the patentable matters as: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent.” This description prevents an inventor from obtaining a patent on
an overly abstract, laws of nature or physical phenomena invention that would preempt
subsequent innovation. Even though patentable subjects are defined in U.S.C, with the
improvement of technology, boundaries of patentable subjects induce important debates.
For example, in a recent case, Myriad Genetics was sued over its claim of patents relating to
two types of biological material that it identified (BRCA1 and BRCA2), whose mutations
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are linked to increased hereditary risk for breast and ovarian cancer. On June 2013, the
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that human genes cannot be patented. They also noted,
however, that a synthetic version of the gene material may be in the scope of patentable
subjects1.
A.1.2 Noninfringement
Patent infringement is the unauthorized manufacture, use, sale, or importation of a patented
invention2. To achieve a legal enforcement, patent holder ordinarily bears the burden of
proving infringement3. After the being alleged for infringing a patent, a defendant argues
that alleged infringed product does not fall into the boundary of the described patent claims.
A patent claim generally contains three elements. First, it has a preamble setting, which
describes the general description of the invention. For example, a claim to an improved
monitor might have the preamble “A monitor...”. Second, patent claims have a a transitional
word or phrase such as “comprising, consisting of and consisting essentially of”. These
phrases explain the ingredients of the invention. Finally, patent claims have the body part,
which explains the details of the invention.
There can be two types of infringement: “literal infringement” and infringement under
the “doctrine of equivalents”. The term “literal infringement” means that the device, system
1http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/13/politics/scotus-genes/
2The definition of “patent infringement” can be found in 35 U.S.C. §271(a) which defines direct infringe-
ment as: “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports
into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent”. In addition, 35 U.S.C. §271(b)
extends liability for infringement to those who“actively induces” another to infringe a patent, and 35 U.S.C.
§271(c) extends liability to contributory infringers as follows: “whoever sells a component of a patented ma-
chine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial non-infringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer”.
3In declaratory judgment actions, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove non-infringement
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or method of another party completely embodies every element enumerated by at least one
patent claim. However, even if there is no literal infringement, a claim may be infringed
under the doctrine of equivalents if accused product or process contain elements identical or
equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention. The purpose of the doctrine
is to prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of a patented invention by changing only
minor or insubstantial details of the claimed invention while retaining the same functionality.
However, there are limits on the scope of doctrine of equivalents to which the patent owner
is entitled. The scope of coverage is limited by (i) the doctrine of “prosecution history
estoppel4” and (ii) the prior art.
In the light of these infringement types, the court process for determining whether an
accused product infringes a claim can be summarized in three steps:
1. Claim construction (i.e, construe the scope of the “literal” language of the claims).
2. Compare the claims, that were construed by the court, with the accused product, to
determine whether there is literal infringement.
3. If no literal infringement is found, then construe the scope of the claims under the
doctrine of equivalents.
A.2 An Example of Infringement Case: Apple vs. Sam-
sung
In the first of the patent wars, on April 15, 2011, Apple sued Samsung in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California alleging that several of Samsung’s An-
4Prosecution history estoppel, also known as file-wrapper estoppel, means that a person who has filed a
patent application, and then makes narrowing amendments, may be precluded from invoking the doctrine
of equivalents to broaden the scope of their claims to cover subject matter ceded by the amendments.
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droid phones and tablets, including the Nexus S, Epic 4G, Galaxy S 4G, and the Samsung
Galaxy Tab, infringed Apple’s 3 utility and 4 design patents5. In this section, I will summa-
rize the noninfringement defenses of Samsung about US Patent No: 7,469,381 (’381)6, which
was one of the most debated patents in the suit. Similar to majority of patent litigations,
the dispute on the noninfringement defense was based on construe of patent claim terms.
Claim Construction Phase:
The central point of the discussion about ’381 patent was about the meaning of “display”
in Claim1.
CLAIM 1 of the ’381 Patent:
A computer-implemented method, comprising:
at a device with a touch screen display:
displaying a first portion of an electronic document;
detecting a movement of an object on or near the touch screen display;
in response to detecting the movement, translating the electronic document displayed on the touch screen
display in a first direction to display a second portion of the electronic document, wherein the second portion
is different from the first portion;
in response to an edge of the electronic document being reached while translating the electronic document
in the first direction while the object is still detected on or near the touch screen display:
displaying an area beyond the edge of the document, and
displaying a third portion of the electronic document, wherein the third portion is smaller than the
first portion; and
in response to detecting that the object is no longer on or near the touch screen display, translating
the electronic document in a second direction until the area beyond the edge of the electronic document is no
longer displayed to display a fourth portion of the electronic document, wherein the fourth portion is different
from the first portion.
In opposition to Apple’s preliminary injunction motion, Samsung argued that “displaying
an area beyond the edge of the document” in claim1 of the ’381 patent requires that at least
some of part of the area beyond the edge of the document emit light or be illuminated. Sam-
sung claimed that this construction is supported by the plain claim language. For example,
5Utility Patents, US Patent No: 7,469,381, 7,844,915, and 7,864,163 and four design patents. US Patent
No: D504,889, D593,087, D618,677, and D604,305
6The ’381 patent is entitled “List scrolling and document translation, scaling, and rotation on a touch-
screen display”
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Claim 1 requires “displaying a first portion of an electronic document” and “display[ing] a
second portion of the electronic document.” In both situations, at least some of part of the
first portion or second portions must emit light. Otherwise, the first or second portions would
not be visible. Likewise, “displaying an area beyond the edge of the document” requires the
emission of light in the area beyond the edge.
According to Samsung’s claim construction, the areas beyond the edge of the documents
that Apple identifies are all black so that these black areas are not “displayed” by the accused
devices. This is because they use AMOLED screens. When an area of an AMOLED display
is black, the pixels corresponding to that area are not emitting any light or being illuminated.
Thus, there is a lack of any display, just as there is a lack of any display when the screen
is turned off7. Despite Samsung’s suggestion for claim construction, the court construed
“displaying” as “showing or revealing to the viewer”8. Since this definition does not include
“emitting light”, Samsung was found infringing the ’381 patent.
7Samsung’s Opposition To Apple’s Motion For A Preliminary Injunction, Case No: 11-cv-01846-LHK
8Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2011 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011) (No. 11-CV-01846-LHK),678 F.3d
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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A.3 Variable Definitions
A.3.1 Financial Variables
Assets = ATQ
Book Leverage = Total Debt / Book Assets = (DLCQ+DLTTQ) / ATQ
Capital Expenditure Ratio= Quarterly capital expenditures (CAPXY) / lagged total as-
sets (ATQ). CAPXY is reported on a year-to-quarter basis; thus I quarterize by subtracting
lagged values.
Cash = Cash / Book Assets = CHEQ / ATQ
R&D = Research and development expenses (XRDQ) / lagged total assets(ATQ)
Return on Assets (ROA) = Operating income before depreciation (OIBDPQ) / lagged
total assets (ATQ)
Return on Equity (ROE) =Income before extraordinary items/one-quarter-lagged book
equity= IBQ/SEQQ
Sales growth = log(sales)- log(lagged sales)= log(SALEQ)-log(L.SALEQ)
Sales =SALEQ
A.3.2 Innovation Variables
In this section, I use the variable definitions in Bena and Li (forth.).
Self-Cite-Ratio: First, I compute the number of awarded patents to the acquirer/target
firm with award years from acquisiton year (ayr)-3 to ayr -1 that cite any of the ac-
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quirer’s/target firm’s other awarded patents. Second, I scale the number from the first
step by the total number of awarded patents to the acquirer/target firm with award years
from ayr-3 to ayr-1.
Knowledge Base Overlap : First, we determine the set of patents that received at least
one citation from any of the acquirer’s patents with award years from ayr-3 to ayr-1 (“the
acquirer’s knowledge base”), the set of patents that received at least one citation from any
of the target firm’s patents awarded over the same three-year period (“the target firm’s
knowledge base”), and the intersection of these two sets as the set of patents cited by both
the acquirer and the target firm (“the common knowledge base”). Second, we compute the
number of patents in “the common knowledge base.”
Acquirer’s (Target’s) Base Overlap Ratio: First, I compute the number of citations
from any of the acquirer’s (target firm’s) patents with award years from ayr-3 to ayr-1 made
to the patents in “the common knowledge base.” Second, I scale the number from the first
step by the number of citations from any of the acquirer’s (the target firm’s) patents with
award years from ayr-3 to ayr-1 made to the patents in “the acquirer’s knowledge base”
(“the target firm’s knowledge base”).
Acquirer’s (Target’s) Cross-Cites Ratio: First, I compute the number of the acquirer’s
(target firm’s) awarded patents with award years from ayr-3 to ayr-1 that cite any of the
target firm’s (acquirer’s) awarded patents. Second, I scale the number from the first step by
the number of the acquirer’s (target firm’s) awarded patents with award years from ayr-3 to
ayr-1.
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A.4 Patent Law Glossary
Appelant: The party, who applies to a higher court for a reversal of the decision of a lower
court.
Appellee: The party, against whom an appeal is filed in the higher court.
Concurring Opinion: is a written opinion by one or more judges of a court which agrees
with the ruling of the majority of the court, but states different reasons as the basis for his
or her decision.
Declaratory Judgment: a lawsuit asking a court to declare a patent invalid or not in-
fringed. Defendant: The party against whom an action or claim is brought in a court of
law.
Doctrine of Equivalents: is an infringement type in which accused product or process
contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention.
Dissenting Opinion: is an opinion in a legal case written by one or more judges expressing
disagreement with the majority opinion of the court which gives rise to its judgment.
Infringement: is the unauthorized manufacture, use, sale, or importation of a patented
invention.
Injunction: is a court order that requires a party to do or refrain from doing specific acts.
In patent litigations, it is used as a court order that prohibits defendant to use, offer for sale,
sell, and import the infringing product.
Judgment as a matter of law (JMOL): is a motion made by a party, during trial, claim-
ing the opposing party has insufficient evidence to reasonably support its case.
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Lawsuit: is a civil action brought in a court of law in which a plaintiff, a party who claims to
have incurred loss as a result of a defendant’s actions, demands a legal or equitable remedy.
Literal infringement: is an infringement type in which device, system or method of an-
other party completely embodies every element enumerated by at least one patent claim.
Patent: is a grant by the government, grounded in Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, that gives the patent owner the exclusive right to make, use, offer for sale, sell,
and import the invention described in the patent for a specific term.
Plaintiff: is the party who initiates a lawsuit (also known as an action) before a court. By
doing so, the plaintiff seeks a legal remedy, and if successful, the court will issue judgment
in favor of the plaintiff and make the appropriate court order (e.g., an order for damages).
Safe Harbor: is a provision of a statute or a regulation that specifies that certain conduct
will be deemed not to violate a given rule.
Summary Judgment: is a judgment entered by a court for one party and against another
party summarily, i.e., without a full trial.
Standard Essential Patent: is a patent that claims an invention that must be used to
comply with a technical standard.
Writ of mandamus: is an extraordinary court order because the case is made without the
benefit of full judicial process. It is typically issued on a case that has already begun.
Writ of Certiorari: is a type of writ, by which Supreme Court decides whether to hear
the case.
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Appendix B
Variable Descriptions
B.0.1 Variable Descriptions
Amount = The total amount of the loan package
Capital Expenditure = Sum of rolling four quarter capital expenditures
Credit Rating = S&P senior long-term debt rating Credit Spread = Yield spread between
Baa and Aaa Moody’s rated corporate bonds
Current Ratio = Total current assets / total current liabilities Debt/Equity = (Long term
debt + debt in current liabilities) / shareholder equity
Debt/Tangible Net Worth=(Long term debt + debt in current liabilities) / (total assets-
total liabilities-intangible assets)
EBITDA = Sum of rolling four quarter operating income before depreciation EBITDA/Debt
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= (Sum of rolling four quarter operating income before depreciation) /(long term debt +
debt in current liabilities)
Fixed Charge Coverage = (Sum of rolling four quarter operating income before depreci-
ation) / (sum of rolling four quarter interest expenses + debt in current liabilities one year
prior)
Lender Capitalization = Lender shareholder equity /total assets
Maturity = The maximum stated maturity of a package in months
Interest Coverage = (Sum of rolling four quarter operating income before depreciation) /
(sum of rolling four quarter interest expenses) Quick Ratio = (Total current assets - inven-
tories) / total current liabilities
Tangible Net Worth = Total assets-total liabilities-intangible assets
Z-Score= 3.3 Pre-tax operating income / total assets + sales / total assets+ 1.4 retained
earnings/ total assets + 1.2(current assets - current liabilities)/total assets+.6 market value
of equity / total liabilities
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